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ABSTRACT 
 
This research investigates the impact of organizations’ collaboration strategies and 
network positional variables on invention performance. Organizations, particularly those 
pursuing a differentiation strategy, are motivated to introduce novel products and services in 
order to remain competitive.  Thus, two questions of interest to such organizations regarding the 
network dynamics of the invention process are: 1) What kind of strategies allow them to attain 
superior invention results? 2) What is the most advantageous structural positioning in a 
collaborative network of innovators? Three independent studies attempt to find answers to these 
questions by using three complementary study approaches.  
In the first study, in order to examine invention performance of organizations with 
different collaboration strategies, a simulation model is constructed and run at various levels of 
technological dynamism and with various types of invention tasks. The cognitive cooperation 
strategy, which pursues technological knowledge integration as a priority, is found to be the most 
effective strategy in most experiments. Success-driven cooperators, whose priority is to 
collaborate with the most effective performers in the network, provided the most consistent 
invention performance. Moreover, different strategies are shown to perform best at certain points 
of the industry environment space spanned by technological dynamism and invention type.   
The second study investigates the impact of positional metrics in a collaboration network 
on the inventive performance of organizations (as measured by the number of patents issued) by 
using survey data. Twenty-eight high-tech companies and universities located in Florida are 
 ix 
surveyed to reveal their collaborative networking map. Network structural measures are obtained 
in order to test the hypotheses that high values in centrality metrics correspond with higher 
inventive performance. The regression analyses imply that degree and closeness centralities are 
predictive indicators of high inventive performance but the data does not support the significance 
of impact of local clustering.  
The third study analyzes the impact of positional metrics on inventive performance by 
using a national database for the announced research and production joint ventures. From the 
most inventive organizations (in terms of patent counts) 63 of them are selected for analysis. 371 
research and production joint ventures are analyzed to identify their relationship network every 
year from 1994 to 2012. The results indicate that the number of joint venture partners, being 
close to other members of the network through network connections and strong local 
connectivity (except for their interaction effect) is associated with higher invention performance.   
All three studies bring new methodological contributions to the area of invention network 
research. The simulation study offers a new model in the area of collaborative invention 
networks. Furthermore, the ideas and practices developed during the construction of the agent 
based simulation model for the invention network can be adapted to similar areas of application. 
The survey study offers a holistic approach for the definition of connections in the development 
of invention network map and empirically tests it. The database study longitudinally analyzes the 
evolution of a highly accurate joint venture network over 19-year period while testing the impact 
of positional metrics with un-weighted and weighted calculation methods.     
Solutions to our health problems, communication or transportation needs etc. are not 
usually found due to some series of fortunate events. They are the product of an effective 
recombination process of technological knowledge. Moreover, effective invention performance 
 x 
is not only important for organizations individually, it is crucial for governments that are 
concerned with the problems of its citizens. Effective ways of facilitating the recombination of 
technological knowledge are addressed and presented to inform both companies and policy 
makers. Better understanding of the dynamics of the invention process will bring more solutions 
to existing problems.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 One of the key drivers of technological advancement and sustainable growth is discovery 
that is followed by innovation. The technological knowledge needed for innovation, however, 
may lie beyond an organization’s own capabilities. A solution to address this problem is to form 
alliances with other organizations. Forming alliances provides important benefits such as better 
financial and other resource capacity, the ability to pool the technological knowledge of partners, 
better infrastructure, reduction of risks, and market penetration.  
 Invention, defined as the first proof of possibility in industrial practice for something 
previously not demonstrated, is a product of a unique process that involves the novel 
recombination and reconfiguration of the ways in which the technological knowledge elements 
are linked together (2).  Moreover, it is collective in nature (1). I adopt a network interaction 
perspective to explain the technological knowledge recombination and invention process. 
Organizations, embedded in the network of relationships, use those relationships as conduits of 
information and know-how. An illustration for the development of an inter-organizational 
relationship network is given in the successive pictures of Figure 1.1. In very simplified terms, a 
few organizations form an alliance (to solve an industrial problem, to make a purchase 
agreement, or otherwise allow sharing of technological knowledge) in Figure1.1 (a), then an 
external organization makes another alliance relationship with an existing member Figure1.1 (b) 
and they eventually weave a network of direct and indirect relationships.  
 2 
 Researchers have attempted to explain the invention process and have studied several 
aspects of invention through network relationships. Organizations are motivated to introduce 
novel products and services in order to establish or maintain a competitive advantage.  Thus, two 
questions of interest to organizations regarding the dynamics of the invention process are: 1) 
What kind of strategies allow organizations to attain superior invention results? 2) What is the 
most advantageous structural positioning in a collaborative network of innovators? 
 Effective innovation performance is not only important for organizations individually; it 
is crucial for industries and even governments that are concerned with the urgent problems of 
society. It is probably not fully acknowledged but “waste” is not only in terms of the assets that 
we can see but it can well be in terms of the “lost” or “locked” technological knowledge or what 
may be called wasted opportunity. Solutions to simple problems may lie just beyond untapped 
collaboration opportunities.   
 Figure 1.2 illustrates a bigger picture that the studies of the following chapters address. 
The first research question relates to the impact of the collaboration strategies on network 
formation and consequently the invention performance. The second question is specifically about 
the impact of the network positional metrics on invention performance.   
 In order to address the research questions, three independent studies are conducted. 
Chapter 2 presents a simulation study that examines the impact of partner selection strategies on 
invention performance, given varying degrees of need for knowledge complementariness and 
motivation to form alliances. Chapter 3 provides the results of a survey administered in the State 
of Florida where the relationship network of 51 high-tech companies and universities were 
obtained and the impact of network positional variables were investigated. Chapter 4 also 
presents research results that focus on the impact of positional metrics on invention output, but 
 3 
this time a national database is utilized to obtain panel data for 63 organizations participating in 
371 research and production joint ventures over a period of 19 years. Chapter 5 concludes the 
work and emphasizes the collective contribution of the three independent studies. 
 
(a) (b) (c) 
 
 
(d) 
(e) 
  
Figure 1.1. Inter-organizational network formation process 
 
 
  
 
Figure 1.2. An illustration of the research questions addressed 
   
 4 
1.1. References 
1. Miettinen, R. Theories of Invention and an Industrial Innovation. Science Studies 9(2):34-48; 
1996. 
 
2. Schilling, M. A. Phelps C. C., Interfirm collaboration networks: The Impact of large-scale 
network structure on firm innovation. Management Science 53(7):1113-1126; 2007. 
 5 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: 
THE IMPACT OF COLLABORATION STRATEGIES ON INVENTION 
PERFORMANCE: A SIMULATION STUDY  
 
2.1. Introduction 
 Over the last two decades, the rate of formation of alliances has increased and the 
motivation for forming alliances has shifted significantly. As knowledge exchange and 
technology transfer motivate alliance formation, alliances became widespread in technology-
intensive industries (17). In parallel with the alliance formation trend, inventions have 
increasingly been the product of more than one inventor. For example, the data from a sample of 
750,000 patents shows that about 65% of patents were registered by one inventor in 1970s, but 
only 30% in 2009 were registered by one inventor. On the other hand, patents registered by three 
and more inventors increased from around 10% to above 40% during the same period (8). 
Similarly, top innovative products borne from collaborative research and development (R&D) 
has increased from 53% in 1975 to 87% in 2006 (5).   
 In this research, organizations are considered as unit of analysis and assume that they aim 
to attain a high invention performance. Since invention is collective in nature (16) and the 
creation of inventions involves the novel recombination and reconfiguration of the ways in 
which the technological knowledge elements are linked together (22), an invention process can 
be modeled using a social network of organizations (15). Previous studies that have used a social 
network approach to model collaborative invention of organizations have examined: the impact 
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of the medium of knowledge exchange on knowledge growth (6), the impact of how knowledge 
is pooled and how firms derive information about potential partners on network formation (7), 
the role of complementary knowledge stocks and knowledge dynamics on the network formation 
(4), the effects of alternative configuration of the knowledge structure on the generation of new 
technological knowledge (3), how knowledge complementariness explain network formation 
(13), and how the knowledge sharing strategies effect invention network’s success (11).  
 Firstly, to our knowledge, collaborative invention network research has not yet studied 
the impact of organizations’ alliance strategies on their invention performances. What type of 
partner selection strategy would yield the best or the most consistent invention performance? For 
partner selection, must the emphasis be on technological capabilities, invention performance 
outcomes or trust?  
 Secondly, an answer indicating the best alliance strategy can be very inadequate if it does 
not take into account the necessities of various levels of knowledge overlap and technological 
intensities in industrial sectors. In related studies, the impact of knowledge complementariness 
(knowledge overlap or cognitive distance are also used) on network formation is examined but 
its impact on organizations’ invention performances is yet to be addressed. Noteboom et al. (18) 
suggest that in order for cooperation to be effective, there is a certain level of knowledge 
complementariness necessary
1
. Sobrero and Roberts (24) also suggest that decomposability of 
tasks for certain inventions plays an important role on performance through affecting the level of 
knowledge complementariness. This raises the following question: What type of partner 
                                                 
1
 They use the term “cognitive distance” rather than knowledge complementariness. In several of 
their studies they suggest that the technological knowledge levels of the two partners must be not 
too close and also not too far away from each other for a successful invention process.  
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selection strategy would benefit most for varying degree of necessity of technological knowledge 
overlap?  
 Thirdly, economic environments or industries force organizations to form alliances at 
various degrees. For instance, Mowery et al. (17) state that there has been a significant increase 
in the rate of formation of alliances in semiconductors, computers, software, and commercial 
aircraft industries over the last two decades
2
. Rosenkopf and Schilling (11) calls the phenomenon 
technological dynamism. They show that the alliance participation rate (that is number of firms 
participating in alliances divided by the number of publicly held firms) varies a great deal with 
variances ranging from 0.05 to 2.60. Therefore, the technological dynamism in some industries 
force organizations to form alliances more so than in other industries. The following question 
arises: Given varying degrees of technological dynamism in different industries, what strategy 
would yield the highest and the most consistent invention performance?  
 To address the above questions, this research examines the impact of partner selection 
strategies on invention performance, given varying degrees of need for knowledge 
complementariness and motivation to form alliances.  
 This research brings two methodological contributions. All invention network simulation 
studies known to the author use an approach that allows only a dyadic (bilateral) partnership at 
any given time. This is an attempt to introduce a model that allows using multilateral 
partnerships at any given time (cycle). Organizations are allowed to form more than one 
partnership, that is, participate in more than one project or venture as in a real practice. 
Furthermore, simultaneously modeling the invention performances of organizations pursuing 
different partner selection strategies is a unique contribution.  
                                                 
2
 Two decades up to the time of their publication in 1996. 
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2.1.1. Embeddedness 
 Relationships among the network of organizations are defined as “embeddedness” (see 
Uzzi (25), and Iandoli et al. (13), for discussion of how embeddedness and network structure 
effect network behavior). Embeddedness implies that the structure and the quality of network 
connections affect and shape the economic behavior and productive performance of 
organizations. The literature proposes three categories of embeddedness: cognitive, relational, 
and structural. Cowan et al. (7) define cognitive embeddedness as organizations’ ability to 
effectively integrate their respective knowledge. In the model, I define one of the partner 
selection strategies as “Cognitive Cooperator” (CC), for which the partner selection decision is 
based on the most effective integration of technological knowledge. Relational embeddedness is 
associated with the accumulation of a trust capital (25).  In the model, one of the partner 
selection strategies is defined as “Relational Cooperator” (RC), for which the partner selection 
decision is based on trust. Structural embeddedness is defined as a social control mechanism to 
coordinate and safeguard exchanges (Jones et al. 1997). For the purposes of the model, I adopt 
the concept in a slightly different way. Structural embeddedness is associated with more efficient 
information spread. Based on the assumption that the invention performance information is 
critical and available to all network members, some organizations’ partner selection decision is 
based on the invention performance aspect of the other members. In order to convey the best 
meaning, I use the term “Success-driven Cooperator”3 (SC) instead of the term 'structural'.  
2.1.2. Technological Dynamism and Uncertainty: The Alpha () Parameter 
 Industrial sectors are categorized due to various characteristics (22). An invention 
network study (11) that uses Thomson’s SDC Platinum database reports that, in a certain year, 
                                                 
3
 Alternatively, it can be called as a “Success-following Cooperator”. 
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there is only 1 firm that participates in a research joint venture from the carpets and rugs 
industry, whereas the number of firms from pharmaceuticals industry participating in a joint 
venture is 568. This does not necessarily mean that the carpets and rugs industry is not 
innovative. On the contrary, it may simply mean that for industries like carpets and rugs, 
organizations tend to make inventions in-house. On the other hand in pharmaceuticals industry, 
firms are forced to form alliances due to the high costs and potential risks. That is, my intuition is 
that due to the nature of their business, organizations are forced to form alliances at various 
levels. 
 When technology is changing rapidly, organizations make use of alliances more often. 
Furthermore, the degree of uncertainty about the direction of technological change can make 
alliances more attractive because they provide flexibility as compared to in-house development 
to solve an industrial problem (20). Altough I adopt the term “technological dynamism and 
uncertainty” for this phenomenon, as defined by Rosenkopf and Schilling (20), several studies 
define this characteristic from their perspectives. For example, Hagedoorn used the term 
“technology intensity of sectors” (12), Ang used “technology intensive industries” (2), Segarra-
Cipres et al. used the term “technological intensity of the sector” (TIS), for similar phenomenon 
(23). Segarra-Cipres et al. take it one step further and parameterizes the level of TIS as 0 for less 
intense sectors and 1 for more intense sectors.  
 Thus, technological dynamism encourages alliance formation and create opportunities 
brings important opportunities for organizations to make inventions. It is therefore expected that 
technological dynamism will increase the invention performance of organizations that are 
motivated to invent, no matter what their partner selection strategy is. It is therefore hypothesized 
 10 
in this study that all three strategies are viable and technological dynamism increases all strategy 
groups’ invention performances.     
 One objective is to observe the performances of CCs, RCs and SCs over the spectrum of 
the industries with different levels of technological dynamism. I introduce the parameter Alpha 
() that takes real values from 0 to 1 in order to model the spectrum of technological dynamism 
levels in various industries. The  parameter provides a spectrum of various industries and 
characterizes the amount of force that is imposed on organizations to form alliances. The purpose 
is the identification of the  space where changes, if any, in performance of organizations 
pursuing different alliance strategies are observable.  
2.1.3. Knowledge Complementariness: The Beta () Parameter  
 As mentioned in cognitive embeddedness, organizations seek effective integration with 
of technological knowledge elements with their partner. The literature suggests that cognitive 
distance in their technological knowledge elements must be a particular match. If firms are too 
close together in technological knowledge, they can understand each other well but there will be 
limited points to share. On the other hand, when they are too far apart, they have difficulty in 
understanding each other but there will be a good chance of information sharing.  
 Noteboom et al. (18) uses the term “cognitive distance” to define the difference between 
the technological knowledge levels of alliance partners. Noteboom et al. (18) and Wuyts et al. 
(26) provide support for their hypothesis that innovation performance is an inverted U-shaped 
function of the technological cognitive distance between partners. Gilsing et al. (10) adopt the 
same idea and use the term “technological distance” for the phenomenon.  
 Cowan et al. (7) use the terms knowledge pooling or knowledge complementarity and 
introduces the idea of “decomposability of innovation” adopted from Sobrero and Roberts (24). 
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If the process is composed of discrete tasks, can be done in isolation, and integrated easily, then 
each partner can be specialized in their area. As mentioned earlier, a definition for invention is 
given as recombination or reconfiguration of knowledge elements. In one extreme, the partners 
can be as far apart and specialized as possible for the invention process to be successful. On the 
other hand, if specialization is not possible, i.e., the process is composed of tasks that must be 
done all together, then, the weaker partner becomes a bottleneck. This is the other extreme where 
the technological knowledge levels of the partners must be as close as possible for the invention 
process to be successful. Iandoli et al. (15) uses the term “knowledge complementariness”, which 
is the form adopted in the meaning of a mutual fit of technology levels that allows best 
performance.  
 Assuming that the best productive cooperation is ensured at different levels of knowledge 
complementariness, a parameter is defined where it characterizes the level at which the 
knowledge difference is the best fit. The Beta () parameter is defined from 0 to 1, where at 
minimum, the partners are most inventive when there is no difference between their 
technological knowledge levels. When Beta is at its maximum, it is a business environment in 
which the partners are most inventive with a maximum difference in between their technological 
knowledge levels. The purpose here is not to identify whether  increases the invention 
performance. It rather provides a spectrum of invention types in the two extremes. One purpose 
of this study is to show that strategies must be differentiated depending on the type of invention. 
The cognitive cooperation strategy is applicable for the type of invention where the tasks are 
decomposable and specialization is possible and desired. The relational cooperation, on the other 
hand, is applicable to the type of invention where the tasks are not decomposable and the 
partners’ knowledge level are required to be similar. Success-driven cooperation is applicable to 
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the new entrants of the market. They need to partner up with the most successful network 
members. Normally, success-driven cooperators’ performance is affected whether 
decomposability or specialization is desired. 
2.1.4. Knowledge and Invention  
  In the context of the study, the term technological knowledge refers to a solution to a 
specific technology problem. Unlike many previous studies, I want to set a clear distinction 
between the term knowledge and invention. In this context, invention refers to the first proof of 
possibility in industrial practice for something previously not known or demonstrated (see Lane 
(14) for a discussion of states of knowledge).  
 As technological problems may pertain to various sectors and domains, technological 
knowledge is defined as categorized elements (domains). For example, an organization may have 
technological knowledge with five different elements, each one at varying levels. Therefore, the 
knowledge level for an organization can be defined as a five dimensional vector. Given the 
definition of invention, the demonstration is tangible (e.g., through patent registration). 
Therefore, invention is represented by one-dimensional scalar value; a higher the invention count 
means a better invention performance.   
 One result of partnership is that it makes partners’ knowledge profile become more 
similar (7). In this study, when the partners collaborate, the peer who has a lower knowledge 
level must increase its knowledge level towards its partner’s higher-level knowledge. The 
process of increase takes place separately for different knowledge elements. Furthermore, the 
rate of increase depends on the strength of their connection. If the two organizations cooperate in 
more than one project (or one joint venture, etc.), the rate of knowledge increase must be greater 
as compared to cooperation in only one project (in one venture).   
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 Several factors play a role in a subsequent invention taking place including technological 
knowledge levels, resources, infrastructure, etc. One of the major decisions for finding a solution 
to a technological problem is whether to do it with internal resources or to form an alliance 
venture. Zahra (27) evaluates independent ventures and corporate ventures for their strategies 
and invention performances. He finds support for the hypotheses that the internal and external 
R&D resource usage differs significantly depending on their venturing strategy. He also shows 
that corporate ventures surpass independent ventures in patenting performance. In this study, the 
two categories of resources are identified as follows: Internal R&D capabilities are translated 
into individual knowledge levels whereas the external resources are translated into the amount of 
network connections both in number of alliances and in number of projects (or ventures) with 
each ally. Specifically, internal knowledge levels increase the chances of invention as long as 
they are high compared to the knowledge levels of the other members of the network. On the 
other hand, high numbers of connections increase the chances of invention too. As discussed 
above (the discussion of the Alpha parameter), the propensity of making alliances is adjusted by 
the Alpha parameter. I aim to examine the invention performance of CCs, RCs and SCs at 
various Alpha levels.   
 Another important factor that is proposed to affect invention success is the knowledge 
complementariness. It is my purpose to observe the performance of CCs, RCs and SCs at various 
conditions of best knowledge-fit. Beta is the adjusting factor for the partners’ most inventive 
state, either when there is no difference, a maximum amount of difference or some moderate 
levels of difference between their technological knowledge levels. 
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2.1.5. Agent Based Simulation  
 Agent based simulation is defined as a collection of intelligent and interacting agents, 
which exist and operate in an environment made up of agents and their relationships. Agent 
based simulation is a powerful research method and is used in innovation networks in many 
research areas (1), including innovation networks and collaboration (9). In this study, 
organizations are considered as independent agents interacting with other members of network, 
based on a set of rules. Based on its specified category of strategy, each one goes through the 
stages of partnership selection, alliance formation, invention and knowledge increase as 
described in the next section.    
 
2.2. Model 
 A narrative description along with the flowchart of the model is as follows. It is assumed 
that the cluster is a closed system where no external organization is allowed to enter and no 
member is allowed to exit. Organizations are assumed to be a part of a greater network in the 
economy. At each cycle, every organization attempts to make inventions, either by itself or in 
collaborations with other organizations. The simulation consists of five stages, the last four are 
repeated cycles (that may typically represent a quarter in practice) as depicted in Figure 2.1.  
2.2.1. Initialization 
 One third of the organizations are assigned with one of the strategies (si): CC, RC or SC. 
The knowledge levels of an organization are identified by a t dimensional vector that specifies 
technological knowledge
4
:  
                                                 
4
 In the initial cycle only, knowledge element levels are produced randomly with normal 
distribution. The number of dimensions in K reduces the chances of disadvantage for starting the 
simulation with low knowledge levels. The model is tested for the effect of the randomization to 
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Ki = [ki1, ki2, .. kit] 
 Each element kit represents the technological knowledge level possessed by the i
th
 firm 
for the t
th
 technological element. The number of technological domains is initially selected to be 
five. However, the simulation has been run for several parameters including different values of 
t
5
.  The organizations are also given a unique ID (di). The last element of each organizations is 
their invention (ci) counts
6
. The state of each organization is, therefore, represented by the 
following S vector:  
Si = [di, si1, ki1, ki2, ki3, ki4, ki5, ci] 
 2.2.2. Partnership Proposals Stage 
 Partnership proposal is a crucial stage of the simulation where CCs, RCs and SCs 
differentiate in their selections strategies. When forming alliances, cognitive cooperators aim to 
for the most effective integration of technological knowledge for themselves. For this reason, 
CCs identify their two lowest-level knowledge elements:  
Li = [li1, li2] 
Along with the assumption that all information regarding knowledge levels of network members 
is available to every member, a CC searches among the members for who has the highest level of 
knowledge at its lowest-level knowledge element (for its li1). Similarly, a second search is made 
for who among the members has the highest level of knowledge at its second lowest-level 
                                                                                                                                                             
see whether starting the simulation with low knowledge levels has an impact on the final 
invention counts. There is no significant impact of starting the simulation with one or two very-
low knowledge elements on the final invention performance. After the first cycle, knowledge 
increase (and decrease) are calculated by the determined rules.  
 
5
 The simulations are run at t=2 and t=20 levels.  
6
 In the initial cycle only, invention counts are produced randomly with a uniform distribution. 
This is in order for SCs to make their initial selections. Right after (before invention stage of the 
first cycle), invention counts are set to ‘0’. Then, they are calculated according to the determined 
simulation rules, for the first and the remaining cycles.    
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knowledge element (li2). Finally, a CC identifies the index numbers of the two best partners for 
its two lowest-level knowledge elements:   
Bi = [bj1, bj2] 
 In the best partners vector, bj1 represents that the index value of the 1
st
 best match for i is 
j. The best partners for a CC can be any one of the CCs, RCs or SCs (except for itself). The 1
st
 
and the 2
nd
 elements of Bi are defined as highly desirable and moderately desirable potential 
allies. The number of projects (or ventures) that a CC proposes in a cycle term is set to be 2 for 
highly desirable potential allies, and 1 for moderately desirable potential allies. 
 The project or the ventures proposed are translated into the number of potential links 
(e.g., connections, ties) in the network model. In this stage, these proposals are determined by all 
CCs and are sent to the potential allies.  
 Relational cooperators base their partner selection decision on trust. Based on the idea 
that continuing partnership enhances the relationship and reduces the risks, RCs aim to keep their 
current allies. For this reason, RCs produce their potential trusted partners list by identifying two 
allies with the highest number of connections.  
Ti = [tj1, tj2] 
 In the trusted allies vector, tj1 represents that the index value of the 1
st
 trusted (and also 
potential future) ally for i is j. Similarly, the best partners for an RC can be any one of CCs, RCs 
or SCs (except for itself). The 1
st
 and the 2
nd
 elements of Ti, are defined as highly desirable and 
moderately desirable potential allies respectively. The relative numbers of projects (connections) 
proposed are 2 and 1, respectively. The proposals are determined by all RCs and are sent to the 
potential allies.  
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Figure 2.1. Invention network simulation stages   
Start 
Initialization 
Si = [di, si, ki1, ki2, ki3, ki4, ki5, ci] 
- Knowledge vectors created 
- Organizations’ strategies are 
identified 
Check the 
strategy 
Partner selection of CCs 
Bi = [bj1, bj2] 
- Potential partners are selected for the 
two lowest-level technological 
elements ki. 
Partner selection of RCs 
Ti = [tj1, tj2] 
- Potential partners are the members 
that have the highest number of 
mutual connections   
Partner selection of SCs 
Pi = [pj1, pj2] 
- Potential partners are the ones with 
the best invention performance 
cumulatively 
si=CC si=RC si=SC 
Proposal Acceptance 
- Partnership proposals are accepted by a 
binomial acceptance probability ()  
Alliances continuation check  
- Partnership are continued or terminated by 
a binomial continuation probability ()  
Begin the cycles 
End 
When all 
cycles 
complete 
Invention Count Increase (summation of all cases)  
- By utilizing external connections (resources) : CRi = (i j xij ) / 2  
- By utilizing internal knowledge:                       CIi = ∑    
 
  ;    = {1, if Q1(k,t)  kit  min(k,t) ; 2, if Q2(k,t)  kit  Q1(k,t) ;  
                                              3, if Q3(k,t)  kit  Q2(k,t) ; 4, if max(k,t)  kit  Q3(k,t) ; 5, if kit = max(k,t) }     
- By effective complementariness of knowledge match:  
                                                            CKij = ∑ {         –                 }
 
  ; rij = |kit – kjt| / Rt and Rt = max(kit – kjt)   i, j.   
Knowledge increase (summation of both cases) 
- Due to the partnership effect:     KPi
+ = round[(  
   
    (   )
  ) (|kit – kjt|/2)]  
- Due to the uncontrolled factors: KU+ or - ; KU+ or - = Uniform random variable [-100, +100] 
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 Success-driven cooperators make their selection decision based on the cumulative 
invention performance of other members. SCs want to know who has the highest number of 
invention counts currently. Therefore, each SC makes a search among cj’s and identifies the 
members with the best and the next best invention performance:   
Pi = [pj1, pj2] 
 The first and the second best performers are proposed 2 and 1 projects respectively. The 
proposals are determined by all SCs and are sent to the potential allies. 
2.2.3. Responding to Proposals Stage 
 Responding is basically a three-step process. Firstly, partnership proposals are evaluated 
and responded to as i) fully accepted, ii) partially (some of proposed projects) accepted, or iii) 
fully denied. To operationalize this process, a random binomial variable is produced over the 
number of proposals during the current cycle with a probability of . As discussed in previous 
sections, alpha is the level of technological dynamism and determines the inclination to make 
(more at high  or less at low ) alliances. It can also be interpreted as the acceptance rate. The 
acceptance rate is the probability of success for a binomial random variable of the accepted 
proposals. It is a global parameter that is applied to all set of proposals at each cycle. So, for 
example, suppose that organization i proposes 2 connections to organization j. The number of 
accepted connections will be within {0, 1, 2} where P(0) = P(2) < P(1) where P(a) is the 
probability of accepting 'a' number of proposals. The accepted proposals are scheduled to be 
effective during the next cycle.     
 Secondly, at each cycle, each project has a potential to come to an end. Current 
connections (before accepted project proposals are put into practice) are evaluated for 
continuation and termination. Similarly, a random binomial variable is produced over the number 
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of current connections with a probability  that is called the continuation rate.  The continuation 
rate is a global parameter, which is applied to all current connections at each cycle.  
 Lastly, responses to connection proposals are obtained and added to the current 
connections state. That is if, say, i has 2 connections with j (e.g., i is working with j over two 
different projects, or as an alternative interpretation, within two different ventures) and j 
accepted 1 of the newly proposed connections from i, then, the number of connections between i 
and j is increased to 3.   
2.2.4. The Stage of Invention Count Increase  
 There are three different ways to increase invention counts increase: i) utilize resources 
that are made available with connections, ii) utilize internal technological knowledge capacity, 
and iii) utilize the effective complementariness of the technological knowledge match. Because 
various industrial conditions are characterized by  (the level of need to form alliances) and by  
(the knowledge difference level at which the partners are productive), the invention count 
increase due to (i) and (ii) will depend on the  level, and count increase due to (iii) depend on 
the  level.  
 The utilization of the external resources for (i) must be thought of in terms of financial, 
infrastructural resources. It is separated from the cognitive side of an invention. The increase in 
the invention count for i due to connections is determined by the following formula:   
CRi = (i j xij ) / 2                                                      (2.1) 
 CRi represents the amount of i’s increase in inventions by utilizing the resources that are 
made available through connections and xij is i's current connections with j (CR: Count increase 
due to the resources). xij values are higher when the value of  is high and lower when the value 
of  is low. The summation over the rows and columns is divided by 2 due to technical reasons. 
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The adjacency matrix X is symmetrical (representing an undirected network) and the number of 
alliances at xij is similarly represented at xji. In order to get the correct number of alliances, half 
of the summation over the rows and columns must be taken.  
 In (ii), higher knowledge capacity means better chances of invention increase. The 
following operation is applied to realize this process. For each knowledge element (ki1 through 
kit), the technological knowledge levels of the members are sorted. This sorted dataset’s 
minimum, 1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
 quartile and max values are identified
7. A member’s invention increase due 
to the internal technological knowledge stock depends on the quartile bracket in which the 
member’s technological knowledge is located for the particular k,t values set. Namely, the higher 
the quartile brackets in which a member’s knowledge falls, the greater invention increase it gets. 
Therefore, in (ii), the increase in the invention counts is determined by the following: 
CIi = ∑    
 
  ;    = 
{
 
 
 
 
                               
                            
                            
                            
                 
                                     (2.2) 
 CIi represents the amount of i’s increase in inventions by utilizing the internal 
technological knowledge stock (CI: Count increase due to internal knowledge stock) and yi is 
invention increase determined at knowledge elements (1 through t). Q1, Q2 and Q3 are 1
st
, 2
nd
 and 
3
rd
 quartiles of the k values at t
th
 technological knowledge domain. Those members who have 
knowledge levels in between the minimum level and Q1 are given one count (because they still 
have some technological knowledge) but it is five times less than those who have the maximum 
level of technological knowledge. Obviously, when  is close to zero (that is, technological 
                                                 
7
 Basically, the minimum, the 25
th
 percentile, the median, the 75
th
 percentile and the maximum 
kit value are determined.    
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inertia does not force organizations to form alliances) then i's invention productivity becomes 
solely from utilizing the internal technological knowledge. 
 The increase on invention counts due to knowledge complementariness is the cognitive 
side of an invention. To operationalize (iii), the minimum and the maximum knowledge levels 
are identified for each knowledge element (ki1 through kit). The difference between the maximum 
and the minimum levels are defined as the technological range in that particular area. Now, for 
any partnership between i and j, the absolute value of the difference between the knowledge 
levels of kit and kjt is divided by the technological range. The yielding percentage amount is 
called paired-percentage that takes a real value (0, 1). When this percentage is small, we 
understand that there is not much discrepancy in between their knowledge levels. This process is 
repeated for each pair at each knowledge element. Each paired-percentage is evaluated against 
the  value in order to find the amount of invention count increase due to effective knowledge 
complementariness. The final increase due to (iii) is found by multiplying with the impact of the 
number of connections between i and j.  
CKi = CKj = ∑ {         –                 }
 
  ; rij = |kit – kjt| / Rt and Rt = max(kit – kjt)   i, j   (2.3) 
 CKi represents the amount of i’s increase in inventions due to effective knowledge 
discrepancies. rij is the paired-percentage and Rt is technological range at t
th
 technology domain 
in a particular cycle. The , the invention type that defines the best knowledge discrepancy 
levels) is defined in (0, 1). When  is close to one (that is, partners are productive at high 
knowledge discrepancy) then i’s and j’s invention productivity is good if they have high 
discrepancy. When  is around 0.5 (that is, partners are productive at a moderate discrepancy) 
then i’s and j’s invention productivity is good if they have a moderate discrepancy.     
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2.2.5. Technological Knowledge Increase Stage 
 There are two ways of technological knowledge increase: i) It is possible through the 
inflow of knowledge due to the alliances, ii) there are also a number of other factors that we 
cannot control. In (i), the partner who has less knowledge increases its knowledge level towards 
its partner’s higher-level knowledge. Just like in the process of finding the knowledge 
discrepancies (to find CKi's), for any partnership between i and j, the absolute value of the 
difference between the knowledge levels of ki and kj are identified at each knowledge element. 
The knowledge levels’ difference is multiplied by a current collaboration factor that is found by 
scaling the number of current connections between i and j by the maximum number of 
connections made between any i and j.   
KPi
+
 = round[(  
   
    (   )
  ) (|kit – kjt| / 2)]                                        (2.4) 
 KPi
+
 represents the amount of increase in the knowledge levels of i.  
 For the factors that we cannot control, I assume a random knowledge increase or 
decrease. The increase is basically explained by the potential knowledge enhancement through 
several possible ways of the organization increasing knowledge internally. The decrease is due to 
the fact that an organization’s loss of human capital in the knowledge area or due to the 
enhancement of other members of the network. Increase (or decrease) is determined by a 
uniform random variable with a mean value of 0. Knowledge increase (decrease) due to 
uncontrolled factors is operationalized by the following formula:   
KU
+ or -
 = Uniform random variable [-100, +100]                                 (2.5) 
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2.3. Validation Tests  
The code is written in R (19) using R Studio (R core team, 2013)
8
. Before running 
simulations of the model, a series of validation tests were applied to make sure that the code 
performs as intended to. A few of the important tests are listed below.  
Firstly, from the initialization to the end of the first cycle of the run, all matrices and 
parameter values produced are observed step by step.  
Secondly, the network map is constructed and visually observed for the parameter effects 
at each cycle. Figure 2.2. is a typical screen-shot for a 45-member network at the end of 8 cycles 
that shows both the network map and the invention counts of individual members. The effect of 
some critical parameters is also visible through visual inspection. For a simple example, alpha 
(proposal acceptance rate) is expected and observed to affect the density of the network. 
Similarly, the lower lambda (continuation rate) levels give a less dense network picture.  
    
 
Figure 2.2. A screen-shot of the network map and invention counts of each member 
                                                 
8
 A version of the code is provided in the Appendix A. The soft copy can also be obtained from the author on 
request. 
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 Finally, invention counts are also inspected for balanced contributions of three possible 
method of increase. For example, if the invention count increases due to internal knowledge 
stocks becomes overwhelmingly larger than the increase due to knowledge complementariness, 
then we possibly miss the observed impact of the  parameter (that is, the spectrum of invention 
types identified by knowledge distances). We would largely observe the impact of internal 
knowledge differences. 
 Similarly, if the invention count increase due to (i), utilization of external connections, 
becomes overwhelmingly larger than the increase due to the (ii), internal knowledge stocks, then 
we possibly miss the observed impact of internal knowledge levels (or indirectly, knowledge 
increases due to the complementariness effect). We would largely observe the impact of network 
connectivity. The cases are so set that all cases provide balanced amounts of contributions to 
invention count increase. 
 
2.4. Expected Parameter Effects 
2.4.1. The Summary of the Model Parameters  
Performance of the strategy groups is expected to be affected by the technology 
parameters α (dynamism in the industry) and β (the type of invention). However, there are other 
important parameters of the model. The simulation will be run over different values of an 
important few of them:  
 N: The number of network members  
 k : The number of technological knowledge domains  
 cyc : The number of cycles to be run   
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The strategy groups in all experiments above are set to constitute 1/3
rd
 of the networks’ 
members. As the final experiment, the combination of the number of members in each strategy 
groups is changed.    
2.4.2. Expected Effects  
The technological dynamism parameter, α, is directly related to the connection density 
because it is formulated as the acceptance rate for proposed projects. At the lowest extreme (α = 
0), no member will be able to establish future connections (except for the ones randomly 
provided in the initialization). In this case, the only increase can be gained through the internal 
knowledge levels. Unless there are connections, internal knowledge levels are only changed by 
uncontrolled (random) increases or decreases. Therefore, in the long run, α = 0 must provide a 
completely random picture of invention performances.  
Increase in α is expected to benefit all strategy groups but presumably in different ways. 
CCs will always look for the members who have best knowledge levels. As α is increased, the 
higher number of connections provides higher amount of increases in CCs’ knowledge levels. 
The higher internal knowledge levels lead to higher invention counts. Therefore, an increase in α 
is expected to have an indirect effect on the invention performance of CCs. RCs always propose 
partnerships to their current partners. As the new proposals are accepted, the current number of 
alliances is incremented by the number of new alliances. As α is increased, the higher number of 
connections accumulates, that is expected to bring invention counts from the category (i), 
utilization of external connections. SCs always follow those members who made the highest 
invention counts. The advantage of SCs is that, because many SCs will offer/get accepted by the 
member of the highest invention count, there exists an accumulation of members. The SCs will 
benefit from the number of connections (in practice, shared resources) this accumulation 
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provides. Note that although there is an increase in the formula of CRi (increase due to the 
external resources) the hypothesized increase in the invention counts is not guaranteed. The 
members’ knowledge levels and knowledge complemetariness will probably be different at each 
cycle and at each run of α. Therefore, maybe not for every member but as a general trend, 
increase in α (technological dynamism) is expected to bring more invention counts for each 
strategy group.   
H1a: Invention counts in CCs are proportional to α level.   
H1b: Invention counts in RCs are proportional to α level.   
H1c: Invention counts in SCs are proportional to α level.   
The impact of α on the invention counts of each strategy group can be observed, 
however, if the impact on each group is at similar levels, the success rates of the groups against 
each other may not be observable. At this point, it may be critical to clarify what is meant by 
“success rate”. In this study, especially for the following hypotheses, the success rate is defined 
as obtaining the higher rates of invention counts against the other groups. The focus of the study 
is to give a comparison of strategies rather than solely observing the parameter effects. If α is 
observed to impact each group at similar levels, the success rates of the strategy groups are not 
expected to change. In such a case, no group gains advantage over another by changing values of 
α.  
The parameter β is expected to provide advantage over the (high or low) knowledge level 
differences. This should noticeably impact the performance of CCs. Because CCs make alliance 
proposals purely based on their lowest knowledge (to match with the highest in the sector) β is 
expected to give a competitive advantage to CCs. Because other groups lack this strategy, an 
increase in β is expected to impact the success rate of CCs against RCs and SCs.   
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H2a: As β increases the success rate of CCs increases.  
Since RCs always keep the partnership with the same members, the differences in 
between the partner’s technological levels are reduced due to longer terms of partnership. 
Therefore, it is expected that lower levels of β would benefit the RCs strategy group. The 
interpretation is that as RCs and their partners (they don’t have to be RCs) work closely over so 
many cycles, they can understand each other very well. These partners expectedly attain higher 
success levels for inventions with less decomposable invention tasks. Such tasks are represented 
by small β and small differences in between the technological levels of partners are rewarded 
through the invention count increase due to knowledge complementariness (CKi = CKj) formula. 
Therefore,     
 H2b: As β decreases the success rate of RCs increases. 
SCs follow the members that make the highest invention counts. Those who make highest 
invention counts are probably from among the members with higher internal knowledge levels. 
Assuming the distribution of the knowledge levels is uniform in SC members, changes in the β 
are not expected to bring more advantage or disadvantage to SCs.  
H2c: The β levels do not affect the success rate of SCs.      
The hypothesized affects are expected to intensify or weaken by some other parameters. 
Consider the number of members in the network. If it is small, some potentially extreme points 
in the knowledge levels or excessive connectivity may prevent the observation of the suggested 
effects. Higher number of members in the network, however, can be expected to intensify the 
abovementioned effects. Therefore, it is hypothesized that N has a positive effect on the 
phenomena of H2a and H2b.        
H3a: Increase in N intensifies the impact of β for the success rate of CCs. 
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H3b: Increase in N intensifies the impact of low-β for the success rate of RCs. 
Like the number of members, the number of cycles is also expected to diminish the 
potential extremity effects. Every other parameter held constant, the higher number of cycles can 
give an idea of the long-term effect of the other parameters on the invention counts. Like in N, 
cyc is also expected to have a positive impact on the phenomena of H2a and H2b.  
H4a: Increase in cyc intensifies the impact of β for the success rate of CCs. 
H4b: Increase in cyc intensifies the impact of low-β for the success rate of RCs. 
Like in a real practice, the number of technological knowledge domains, k, must increase 
the invention counts in the model. As CCs primarily decide on the knowledge levels, it can be 
expected that any change in k mostly impacts CCs. Like all others, since CCs send proposals to 
the most desirable and the moderately desirable members only, the impact of k must be felt at the 
peak when k is at the smallest level (k=2). So any increase in k is expected to decrease the 
impact of this cognitive match advantage and result in the reduction of the success rate of CCs. 
No increase or decrease is suggested for the success rate of RCs and SCs due to a change in the 
level of k.  
H5: Increase in k has a negative effect on the success rate of CCs.   
The members in the strategy groups are initially designed to be equal in number (N/3, 
N/3 and N/3). As the final analysis, the impact of the change in their numbers is to be observed. 
For example, instead of a balanced number (N/3) of CCs, RCs and SCs in the network, CCs can 
be set to have the majority, say 2N/3, then RCs or SCs are left at N/6 each. The same unbalance 
can be applied in turns. In one of the extreme points, say, when all members are CCs, all 
members will have the same advantages and disadvantages. No significant differences must be 
expected between the success rates of members. A similar effect can be stated for all RCs and 
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SCs. In case of an increase in the members of one group, the case of the two groups with a 
smaller number of members must be considered for they may either gain benefit out of being in 
small numbers or disadvantaged due to that. However, there seems to be no reason to affect the 
performance in case of a change in the combination of the number of members. Therefore, 
changing the combination of the number of strategy members is not expected to change the 
success rates of any strategy groups.    
H6: Unbalanced number of members does not affect the suggested β impact on CCs, RCs 
and SCs.  
 The phenomena in the twelve hypotheses (listed as H1a, H1b, H1c, H2a, H2b, H2c, H3a, 
H3b, H4a, H4b, H5, and H6) are analyzed in the results section. Table 2.1 provides a summary 
of which parameter is related to the phenomena represented by hypotheses.    
 
Table 2.1. The summary of parameters and related hypotheses 
Parameter Related hypotheses 
α  H1a, H1b, H1c 
β H2a, H2b, H2c 
N H3a, H3b 
cyc H4a, H4b 
k H5 
Unbalanced number 
of members 
H6 
   
 
2.5. Results 
 In the sections that follow, one can observe how the invention performances of the 
strategy groups change with the expected impact of the parameters. Firstly, a visual impression 
of the observable effects of some parameters is provided in Figure 2.3. The network is run with 
N=45 members. Each node shows the name of its strategy group and its identification number. 
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The changes in density (the ratio of the number of edges and the number of possible edges) must 
give an idea for the effect of α. Dense connectivity (α = 0.8) represent technologically dynamic 
industries. As the number of cycles increased, not only does the shape of the network change but 
also members are repositioned. Some members occupy very central positions over time.  
  
  
(α, cyc) = (0.2, 10) (α, cyc) = (0.2, 40) 
  
(α, cyc) = (0.8, 10) (α, cyc) = (0.8, 40) 
      
Figure 2.3. The effects of α and cyc on the network density and the connection structure. 
  
 Note that the groups (CCs, RCs and SCs) are more separated from each other over 40 
cycles. The reason of separation may be explained differently for each group. Because CCs only 
go after the highest kt’s, they probably find it at another CC in the long run because knowledge 
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increases due to the partnership provides knowledge advantage to CCs at every cycle. They do 
not need RCs and SCs anymore unless they somehow have high kt values. RCs are not separated 
completely because they value their historical connections and continue connected to their CC, 
RC and SC partners. 
 SCs usually create an accumulation on one or a few members. In fact, when they are 
connected to a historically successful member, they make it more successful due to the number 
of connections (resources) they provide, like they did it to RC4 and SC14 in the right bottom 
picture of the Figure 2.3. In fact, the invention count performances (accumulated over 40 cycles) 
clearly indicated that RC4 and SC14 are leading in the invention counts (not shown here).          
2.5.1. The Effect of α on the Strategy Groups 
It was claimed that the invention counts are proportionate to α levels  (H1a, H1b and 
H1c). A quick experiment shows the comparison of the performance levels of members in each 
group against α levels. Keeping everything else constant9, α is set to the values of 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 
0.8 and 1. The corresponding impact can be observed in Figure 2.4. In general, the invention 
counts increase with an increase in α for all strategy groups. The correlation values for each 
member are provided in Table 2.2. Note that the magnitude of the invention counts must be taken 
as comparative values rather than exact representation of a real practice. Invention counts in an 
empirical observation depend on several factors, like size of the organization, invention policy 
etc., which I do not consider in this research. Similar increases can be observed in invention 
counts with an increase in α, for all strategy groups at various parameter values of N, k and cyc. 
Therefore, I find support for my hypotheses H1a, H1b and H1c.  
                                                 
9
 N: Number of organizations, k: number of technological domains and cyc: number of cycles are 
set to (12, 2, 10)  
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3.5.2. Performance Plots   
Before evaluation of the next set of hypotheses, it is useful to view some more visual 
impressions of the simulation. Figure 2.5 shows an average performance plot of the three groups 
against the counting cycles. The experiment in Figure 2.5 is run with N=12 where there are 4 
members in each group. The lines represent the strategy groups and each data point is the 
average invention count of the 4 members. Because the invention counts is a cumulative 
measure, they are non-decreasing plots. 
The performance at the end of 40
th
 cycle is the average of the total counts for each group 
over 40 cycles. Figure 2.5 is a typical picture of one experiment. Mean performances do not 
exhibit perfectly linear increases and the differences between groups may increase or decrease 
even after several cycles. For this reason, the experiments are applied in cyc=10, 20 and 40 
cycles to observe changes and test the hypotheses H4a and H4b. 
Figure 2.6 is the representation of the same plot with the results of 10 experiments 
(replications) shown on the right hand side. Note that the current plot only shows the last 
experiment’s result where CC has been the winner at average invention performance counts. The 
plots related to the initial 9 experiments are not shown here.    
For the results in Figure 2.6, the experiments are run in the following settings: N=12, k=2, 
cyc=10, α=0.0 and β=0.5. 
2.5.3. Performance Table of Experiments 
As discussed in the model specification, the primary representation of the results will be 
for the changing values of α (technological dynamism) and β (invention type). α and β are both 
set to assume the values (0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0) and 10 replications of the experiment is run for 
each pair of setting, like (α, β) = (0, 0) ; (α, β) = (0, 0.2), and so on. 
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Figure 2.4. Invention performances at α levels 
 
Table 2.2. Pearson-correlation values for α against invention counts 
Members CC1 CC2 CC3 CC4 RC1 RC2 RC3 RC4 SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 
Correlation values 0.86 0.98 0.40 0.68 0.81 0.66 -0.02 0.36 0.94 0.72 0.79 0.80 
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Figure 2.5. Average performance plot for one experiment 
 
  In order to present the results at different pairs of (α, β), a 6x6 table is constructed with 
each cell showing the results of 10 experiment runs. 
 
 
Figure 2.6. The results of 10 replications 
 
 Table 2.3 is the representation of such a table where other parameter values are at N=24, 
k=5 and cyc=20. The α levels are increased from left to right and the β values are increased from 
bottom to top. In each cell, the numbers across strategy groups indicate the number of “wins”, 
that is the number of times that the average invention counts of the members of the strategy 
groups become the highest among 10 replications of the same experiment. The outcomes with a 
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member winning more than 5 experiments are colored and bolded. This is because the outcomes 
that groups receive up to 5 wins can be considered out of chance, however, the probability of 
getting outcome sets above 5 wins by chance quickly diminishes towards 10 wins. For example, 
the probability of obtaining the outcome of CC=7, RC=3, SC=0 wins by chance, P(7, 3, 0), is 
0.002. The probability of obtaining the family of the outcome set for 7, 3, 0 values, that is P(7, 3, 
0)+ P(7, 0, 3)+ P(3, 7, 0)+P(3, 0, 7)+P(0, 7, 3)+P(0, 3, 7), is 0.012. The multinomial probabilities 
of 14 outcome sets for three outcomes, and p=1/3 for each, are provided in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.3. An example table for performances over various (α, β) values 
β =  
1.0 
CC 2 CC 5 CC 4 CC 6 CC 7 CC 7 
RC 4 RC 1 RC 4 RC 3 RC 0 RC 3 
SC 4 SC 4 SC 2 SC 1 SC 3 SC 0 
0.8 
CC 5 CC 3 CC 6 CC 4 CC 5 CC 6 
RC 3 RC 3 RC 3 RC 3 RC 4 RC 3 
SC 2 SC 4 SC 1 SC 3 SC 1 SC 1 
0.6 
CC 3 CC 6 CC 3 CC 3 CC 7 CC 3 
RC 4 RC 3 RC 3 RC 4 RC 3 RC 3 
SC 3 SC 1 SC 4 SC 3 SC 0 SC 4 
0.4 
CC 5 CC 3 CC 4 CC 10 CC 4 CC 3 
RC 1 RC 3 RC 2 RC 0 RC 4 RC 6 
SC 4 SC 4 SC 4 SC 0 SC 2 SC 1 
0.2 
CC 6 CC 4 CC 5 CC 5 CC 5 CC 4 
RC 2 RC 4 RC 3 RC 2 RC 4 RC 4 
SC 2 SC 2 SC 2 SC 3 SC 1 SC 2 
0.0 
CC 2 CC 4 CC 7 CC 3 CC 5 CC 5 
RC 3 RC 4 RC 3 RC 4 RC 2 RC 2 
SC 5 SC 2 SC 0 SC 3 SC 3 SC 3 
α =  0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 1.0 
  
  Note that the sum of the probabilities of obtaining outcomes by chance up to 5 wins is 
0.77. The sum of the probabilities of obtaining outcomes with 6 by chance is 0.17 and with 7 by 
chance is only 0.05. When you consider the probability of 6 or 7 wins of only one specific group, 
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CC, RC or SC, by chance becomes one third of those values. In other words, the probability of 
obtaining 6 wins by chance, for CCs for example, becomes 0.06 (and 0.017 for 7 wins).  
 In summary, those cells with results containing 6 or more wins are considered to require 
attention, especially, when a couple of them are observed side-by-side in the table of 
performances.    
 
Table 2.4. The multinomial probabilities of outcome sets 
Family of 
outcomes* 
Multinomial 
Coefficient 
Probability of obtaining 
the outcome by chance 
Number of 
combinations 
The probability of obtaining 
the outcome family 
4 3 3 4200 0.071 3 0.213 
4 4 2 3150 0.053 3 0.160 
5 3 2 2520 0.043 6 0.256 
5 4 1 1260 0.021 6 0.128 
5 5 0 252 0.004 3 0.013 
6 3 1 840 0.014 6 0.085 
6 2 2 1260 0.021 3 0.064 
6 4 0 210 0.004 6 0.021 
7 2 1 360 0.006 6 0.037 
7 3 0 120 0.002 6 0.012 
8 1 1 90 0.002 3 0.005 
8 2 0 45 0.001 6 0.005 
9 1 0 10 0.000 6 0.001 
10 0 0 1 0.000 3 0.000 
*In the family of, say (5, 4, 1), there are 6 different combinations of outcomes. Therefore, the probability of 
obtaining exactly (5, 4, 1), is multiplied by 6 in order to find the probability of the family of outcomes.   
 
     
2.5.4. The Parameter Space of N, k and cyc 
 The performance results in Table 2.2 are obtained at parameter values N=24, k=5, 
cyc=20. The series of hypotheses, H2a, H2b, H2c, H3a, H3b, H4a, H4b, and H5, are related with 
the success rates of the strategies against each other with changing parameters. In order to 
proceed with the observations related to these hypotheses, each parameter value is extended to a 
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smaller and a higher point. Therefore, the experiments are designed to run at N=12, 24 and 45; 
k=2, 5 and 20; cyc=10, 20 and 40. This creates an experiment space of 27 combinations. One 
can, then, report whether the phenomena explained in hypotheses are observed towards 
increasing or decreasing values of N, k and cyc.  
2.5.5. The Effect of β on the Strategy Groups  
 The hypotheses H2a, H2b and H2c are related to the impact of β on the success rates of 
strategies against each other. A visual observation helps to see the support for each hypotheses at 
the performance table at N=45, k=2 and cyc=10 (Table 2.5). In order to understand the impact 
better, correlation values are provided at Table 2.6.  
 The positive correlation values for CCs indicate that an increase in β level increases the 
success rate of CCs against the other strategies. The negative correlation values for RCs provide 
support for H2b that claimed lower β gives higher RC success rates against others. SCs success 
rates do not exhibit a consistent increase or a decrease. Therefore, H2c cannot be rejected. 
Similar results are obtained in the majority of performance tables created at various parameter 
values of N, k and cyc. In some performance tables, especially in low N and low cyc, β impact is 
not observed, which will be presented in the next section. 
 Note that the correlation values at α = 0.0 is not provided. The success rates at α = 0.0 
must not be used because it is the level when no venture proposals are accepted. Because no 
additional connection can be done, the success rates are partly the results of initial (random) 
endowments of the connections and mostly due to the randomly increased/decreased knowledge 
levels (increase/decrease because of the unknown factors, KU
+ or -
).  
 One advantage it provides, though, is that one can observe the complete randomness in 
the first column of the performance tables as compared to the various phenomena observed in the 
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next five columns. It serves like a control group to other columns but must be disregarded in the 
analyses. 
 
Table 2.5. The β impact on success rates of CCs and RCs  
β =  
1.0 
CC 4 CC 6 CC 6 CC 6 CC 8 CC 3 
RC 5 RC 2 RC 2 RC 2 RC 1 RC 4 
SC 1 SC 2 SC 2 SC 2 SC 1 SC 3 
0.8 
CC 3 CC 6 CC 4 CC 3 CC 6 CC 6 
RC 6 RC 1 RC 3 RC 5 RC 3 RC 1 
SC 1 SC 3 SC 3 SC 2 SC 1 SC 3 
0.6 
CC 2 CC 3 CC 6 CC 5 CC 5 CC 6 
RC 1 RC 2 RC 3 RC 4 RC 1 RC 1 
SC 7 SC 5 SC 1 SC 1 SC 4 SC 3 
0.4 
CC 3 CC 7 CC 5 CC 6 CC 5 CC 4 
RC 3 RC 3 RC 3 RC 0 RC 1 RC 2 
SC 4 SC 0 SC 2 SC 4 SC 4 SC 4 
0.2 
CC 3 CC 2 CC 5 CC 7 CC 4 CC 5 
RC 2 RC 7 RC 3 RC 1 RC 3 RC 4 
SC 5 SC 1 SC 2 SC 2 SC 3 SC 1 
0.0 
CC 1 CC 3 CC 4 CC 1 CC 4 CC 6 
RC 7 RC 4 RC 3 RC 6 RC 2 RC 2 
SC 2 SC 3 SC 3 SC 3 SC 4 SC 2 
α =  0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 1.0 
  
 
Table 2.6. Pearson-correlation values for β against the success rates  
Correlation values at α = 0.2 α = 0.4 α = 0.6 α = 0.8 α = 1.0 
CCs 0.59 0.48 0.28 0.92 -0.42 
RCs -0.73 -0.65 -0.09 -0.27 0.00 
SCs 0.18 -0.21 -0.41 -0.76 0.52 
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 2.5.6. The Effect of the Size of the Network, N  
 The hypotheses H3a and H3b are related to the N’s intensification effect for the impact of 
β on CCs and RCs. The performance table, at N=12, k=2 and cyc=40, provides support for H3a 
and H3b (Table 2.7). This example, however, must be observed in a reverse manner. In fact, the 
intensification can be observe at Table 2.5, whereas Table 2.7 shows a diminishing effect of 
lower N for the impact of β. Because N=12 in this case, it can be observed that correlation values 
for CCs are lowered (Table 2.8).  
 As mentioned in the previous section, the performance table at N=12, k=2 and cyc=40 
(Table 2.7) is not an example of support for the negative the impact of β on RCs (H2b). 
However, as already shown in Table 2.5, higher N intensified the impact of β on RCs, and made 
it observable. Therefore Table 2.7 does not provide support for H2b or H3b but the results in 
Table 2.5 of the previous section actually provides support for both H2b and H3b. 
2.5.7. The Effect of the Number of Cycles, cyc 
 The hypotheses H4a and H4b are related to the intensification effect of cyc for the β 
impact on CCs and RCs’ success rates. Table 2.5 provided the performance table at N=45, k=2 
and cyc=10. Now, we can make a comparison if we look at the performance table at N=45, k=2 
and cyc=40, which is provided in Table 2.9. 
 The correlation values at Table 2.10 clearly show that the β impact on CCs’ success rates 
intensified as compared to a lower cyc experiment (given in Table 2.5). However it does not 
seem to make the same impact on the RCs’ success rates. Therefore, in the performance table at 
N=45, k=2 and cyc=40, I find support for H4a but not for H4b. 
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Table 2.7. The diminishing β impact towards lower N 
β =  
1.0 
CC 4 CC 6 CC 8 CC 9 CC 6 CC 6 
RC 3 RC 2 RC 0 RC 1 RC 2 RC 4 
SC 3 SC 2 SC 2 SC 0 SC 2 SC 0 
0.8 
CC 5 CC 8 CC 4 CC 6 CC 5 CC 2 
RC 3 RC 1 RC 3 RC 3 RC 5 RC 6 
SC 2 SC 1 SC 3 SC 1 SC 0 SC 2 
0.6 
CC 2 CC 5 CC 8 CC 8 CC 7 CC 4 
RC 3 RC 2 RC 2 RC 1 RC 2 RC 2 
SC 5 SC 3 SC 0 SC 1 SC 1 SC 4 
0.4 
CC 2 CC 6 CC 5 CC 7 CC 7 CC 5 
RC 4 RC 1 RC 3 RC 2 RC 2 RC 4 
SC 4 SC 3 SC 2 SC 1 SC 1 SC 1 
0.2 
CC 7 CC 7 CC 5 CC 7 CC 6 CC 6 
RC 2 RC 3 RC 3 RC 2 RC 4 RC 0 
SC 1 SC 0 SC 2 SC 1 SC 0 SC 4 
0.0 
CC 3 CC 7 CC 7 CC 6 CC 5 CC 3 
RC 2 RC 1 RC 1 RC 1 RC 3 RC 4 
SC 5 SC 2 SC 2 SC 3 SC 2 SC 3 
α =  0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 1.0 
 
Table 2.8. Pearson-correlation values for β against the success rates: The effect of N  
Correlation values at α = 0.2 α = 0.4 α = 0.6 α = 0.8 α = 1.0 
CCs -0.15 0.16 0.59 0.12 0.07 
RCs 0.00 -0.25 0.13 -0.08 0.41 
SCs 0.14 0.05 -0.82 0.00 -0.59 
 
2.5.8. The Effect of the Technological Knowledge Domains, k 
 H5 is related to the negative effect of k for the β impact on CCs’ success rates. Table 2.9 
provided the performance table at N=45, k=2 and cyc=40. Now, we can make a comparison if 
we look at the performance table at N=45, k=20 and cyc=40, which is provided in Table 2.11. 
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Table 2.9. The intensifying β impact is towards higher cyc 
β =  
1.0 
CC 1 CC 10 CC 10 CC 9 CC 9 CC 9 
RC 5 RC 0 RC 0 RC 1 RC 1 RC 1 
SC 4 SC 0 SC 0 SC 0 SC 0 SC 0 
0.8 
CC 6 CC 9 CC 10 CC 9 CC 10 CC 10 
RC 3 RC 1 RC 0 RC 1 RC 0 RC 0 
SC 1 SC 0 SC 0 SC 0 SC 0 SC 0 
0.6 
CC 1 CC 9 CC 8 CC 9 CC 10 CC 8 
RC 4 RC 0 RC 1 RC 1 RC 0 RC 1 
SC 5 SC 1 SC 1 SC 0 SC 0 SC 1 
0.4 
CC 4 CC 10 CC 8 CC 10 CC 8 CC 10 
RC 3 RC 0 RC 2 RC 0 RC 2 RC 0 
SC 3 SC 0 SC 0 SC 0 SC 0 SC 0 
0.2 
CC 2 CC 8 CC 7 CC 6 CC 7 CC 9 
RC 4 RC 1 RC 3 RC 3 RC 1 RC 1 
SC 4 SC 1 SC 0 SC 1 SC 2 SC 0 
0.0 
CC 2 CC 8 CC 8 CC 8 CC 7 CC 8 
RC 6 RC 1 RC 1 RC 2 RC 1 RC 0 
SC 2 SC 1 SC 1 SC 0 SC 2 SC 2 
α =  0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 1.0 
 
Table 2.10. Pearson-correlation values for β against the success rates: The effect of cyc  
Correlation values at α = 0.2 α = 0.4 α = 0.6 α = 0.8 α = 1.0 
CCs 0.72 0.83 0.50 0.81 0.36 
RCs -0.49 -0.69 -0.52 -0.36 0.29 
SCs -0.68 -0.41 -0.39 -0.83 -0.57 
 
 
 The correlation values at Table 2.12 clearly show that the β impact on CCs’ success rates 
weakened as compared to a lower k experiment (given in Table 2.10). It gives a strong support to 
H5, which claims that as k increases the β impact on CCs’ success rates diminish.  
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Table 2.11. The diminishing β impact towards higher k 
β =  
1.0 
CC 3 CC 8 CC 5 CC 4 CC 3 CC 3 
RC 4 RC 1 RC 2 RC 3 RC 6 RC 5 
SC 3 SC 1 SC 3 SC 3 SC 1 SC 2 
0.8 
CC 3 CC 5 CC 4 CC 3 CC 6 CC 4 
RC 6 RC 4 RC 4 RC 5 RC 1 RC 3 
SC 1 SC 1 SC 2 SC 2 SC 3 SC 3 
0.6 
CC 2 CC 6 CC 3 CC 5 CC 5 CC 3 
RC 3 RC 3 RC 4 RC 4 RC 0 RC 5 
SC 5 SC 1 SC 3 SC 1 SC 5 SC 2 
0.4 
CC 2 CC 3 CC 6 CC 2 CC 4 CC 7 
RC 3 RC 5 RC 2 RC 4 RC 3 RC 2 
SC 5 SC 2 SC 2 SC 4 SC 3 SC 1 
0.2 
CC 3 CC 5 CC 7 CC 1 CC 2 CC 1 
RC 2 RC 3 RC 2 RC 5 RC 5 RC 7 
SC 5 SC 2 SC 1 SC 4 SC 3 SC 2 
0.0 
CC 3 CC 5 CC 4 CC 3 CC 3 CC 3 
RC 3 RC 3 RC 3 RC 1 RC 2 RC 2 
SC 4 SC 2 SC 3 SC 6 SC 5 SC 5 
α =  0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 1.0 
 
Table 2.12. Pearson-correlation values for β against the success rates: The effect of k  
Correlation values at α = 0.2 α = 0.4 α = 0.6 α = 0.8 α = 1.0 
CCs 0.59 -0.25 0.53 0.47 0.14 
RCs -0.36 0.16 0.36 0.12 0.16 
SCs -0.88 0.26 -0.73 -0.64 -0.43 
 
 Note that the performance table at N=45, k=20 and cyc=40 is another example where β 
impact on RCs’ success rates cannot find support. It is true for all performance tables at various 
combinations of N, k and cyc that they present support for some hypothesis but not for some 
others. The next section provides the major picture for the supported hypotheses at each 
combination of N, k and cyc.  
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2.5.9. The Main Table: A Summary for the Representation of the Effects    
 As mentioned earlier, for all 27 combinations of N, k and cyc values at (12, 24, 45); (2, 5, 
20) and (10, 20, 40) consecutively, experiments are run and the performance tables are created. 
Not all performance tables are shown here, but the observed phenomena related to hypotheses 
H2a, H2b, H2c can be listed for all combinations. The Main Table, Table 2.13, lists the supported 
hypotheses for combinations of N, k and cyc values. The table also gives us the chance to see 
whether H3a, H3b, H4a, H4b and H5 are supported by observation through higher N, k and cyc 
values.  
  
Table 2.13. The main table: Supported hypotheses for N, k and cyc values 
  
Number of members in the invention network 
Number 
of cycles 
Number of 
technological 
domains  
N=12 N=24 N=45 
cyc=10 
k=2 H2a, H2b, H2c  H2a, H2b, H2c  H2a, H2b, H2c  
k=5 H2a, H2b, H2c H2a, H2b, H2c H2a, H2b, H2c  
k=20 H2a, H2b, H2c  H2a, H2b, H2c  H2a, H2b, H2c  
cyc=20 
k=2 H2a, H2b, H2c H2a, H2b, H2c H2a, H2b, H2c  
k=5 H2a, H2b, H2c  H2a, H2b, H2c  H2a, H2b, H2c  
k=20 H2a, H2b, H2c H2a, H2b, H2c H2a, H2b, H2c  
cyc=40 
k=2 H2a, H2b, H2c  H2a, H2b, H2c  H2a, H2b, H2c  
k=5 H2a, H2b, H2c H2a, H2b, H2c H2a, H2b, H2c  
k=20 H2a, H2b, H2c  H2a, H2b, H2c  H2a, H2b, H2c  
 
 To ensure the clarity of the results, the following representation method is applied. When 
these phenomena related to the hypotheses are strongly observed, the name of the hypotheses are 
indicated with normal text (100% black font color) in the corresponding cell. When very weakly 
observed or not observed at all, they are written with light grey text (25% darkness), which 
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means the phenomena is barely there or not there. For example, if there is a cell with no normal 
text (all grey), it means no proof for hypotheses are observed and the average invention count 
performance wins for given combination of the parameters, N, k and cyc, are similar to a 
complete random multinomial experiment. 
 H2a and H2c find support from the majority of the invention count performance tables. 
Although H2b does not from support the majority of the tables, it finds support from many of 
them and there were no tables that disprove the phenomenon (that an increase in β to lead higher 
success rates in RC).  
 I opt to not represent the group of hypotheses H3a, H3b, H4a and H4b on the Main Table. 
Based on the trends towards higher N, k and cyc on the table, it can be observed whether they are 
supported or not. For example, for H3a and H3b, we can observe whether there is an increasing 
evidence in support of H2a and H2b for increasing N (from the left to the right hand side of the 
Table 2.13). Over the nine observations (the nine rows) for the intensity of H2a towards the right 
hand side of the table, one cannot see a clear support for H3a. Similarly, H3b cannot find support 
from many lines of the table.   
 H4a and H4b are related to cyc, so, one has to check each column to see if there is an 
increasing evidence in support of H2a for increasing cyc. The nine observations here must be by 
checking each H2a at every three rows. In fact, not many columns support the increase the in 
visibility of H2a. Therefore, H4a is not supported. Similarly, H3b cannot find support from many 
columns of the table.  
  H5 is related to k, so, one has to check each column to see if there is a trend for more H2a 
for decreasing k. Indeed, there is an increase in the evidence in support of H2a as k decreases. 
Therefore, I find support for H5.   
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2.5.10. The Effect of Unbalanced Number of Members 
 Three experiments were conducted to observe the effect of an unbalanced number of 
members. The experiments are prepared for N=24, k=5 and cyc=20 and in each case, one of the 
strategy groups had 2N/3 members and the other two had N/6 members each. The results are 
compared with the previously applied balanced experiments at N=24, k=5 and cyc=20. The 
reason that the experiments are done at (24, 5, 20) is because it is the performance table where 
the three of the phenomena are observable explained in H2a, H2b and H2c. The purpose is to test 
whether the unbalanced member configuration changes the results on the observed phenomena.       
 Table 2.14 provides the performance table for the experiment where CCs are with 4, RCs 
are with 16 and SCs are with 4 members at N=24, k=5 and cyc=20, which was one of the 
experiments designed. This table shows that the impact of β on the success rate of CCs still 
observable. A similar observation is possible for the experiment that was run for table for the 
configuration where CCs are with 4, RCs are with 4 and SCs are with 16 members. However, it 
was not observable at the experiment where CCs with 4, RCs with 4 and SCs with 16 members. 
Table 2.15, actually, provides a complete picture of correlation values for β against the success 
rates in all unbalanced experiments applied. 
2.5.11. Success Rates of Strategy Groups  
 One of the primarily expected results of the developed model was the identification of the 
most effective collaboration strategy. This section is provided after several steps of analyses in 
order to give a better idea of what parameters are influencing the success rates of the strategies. It 
is also provided along with the consistencies in the next section to make a better evaluation. The 
results from the 27 performance tables indicate that cognitive cooperation is the most effective  
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Table 2.14. The success rates of an experiment for unbalanced members  
β =  
1.0 
CC 5 CC 6 CC 5 CC 5 CC 5 CC 7 
RC 2 RC 1 RC 1 RC 2 RC 3 RC 2 
SC 3 SC 3 SC 4 SC 3 SC 2 SC 1 
0.8 
CC 6 CC 2 CC 4 CC 5 CC 6 CC 5 
RC 1 RC 1 RC 2 RC 1 RC 2 RC 0 
SC 3 SC 7 SC 4 SC 4 SC 2 SC 5 
0.6 
CC 3 CC 5 CC 6 CC 3 CC 5 CC 5 
RC 1 RC 3 RC 3 RC 5 RC 2 RC 4 
SC 6 SC 2 SC 1 SC 2 SC 3 SC 1 
0.4 
CC 2 CC 2 CC 5 CC 6 CC 2 CC 5 
RC 4 RC 4 RC 2 RC 3 RC 6 RC 1 
SC 4 SC 4 SC 3 SC 1 SC 2 SC 4 
0.2 
CC 1 CC 4 CC 3 CC 3 CC 3 CC 6 
RC 3 RC 2 RC 5 RC 3 RC 4 RC 1 
SC 6 SC 4 SC 2 SC 4 SC 3 SC 3 
0.0 
CC 1 CC 4 CC 1 CC 6 CC 5 CC 3 
RC 4 RC 4 RC 4 RC 3 RC 2 RC 1 
SC 5 SC 2 SC 5 SC 1 SC 3 SC 6 
α =  0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 1.0 
 
 
Table 2.15. Pearson-correlation values for β against the success rates: The effect of unbalance 
Experiment 
number 
Configuration 
of the members  
Correlation 
values at => 
α = 0.2 α = 0.4 α = 0.6 α = 0.8 α = 1.0 
1 
16 CCs 0.00 -0.38 0.00 -0.11 -0.25 
4 RCs -0.31 0.08 -0.45 -0.12 0.40 
4 SCs 0.40 0.34 0.36 0.26 -0.20 
2 
4 CCs 0.23 0.72 -0.08 0.43 0.68 
16 RCs -0.74 -0.84 -0.36 -0.17 0.19 
4 SCs 0.34 -0.04 0.43 -0.68 -0.57 
3 
4 CCs 0.69 0.07 0.76 0.66 -0.72 
4 RCs -0.51 0.41 -0.31 0.00 -0.06 
16 SCs 0.00 -0.38 -0.85 -0.55 0.66 
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strategy in most areas of the parameter space of (α, β). In a given performance table, if a strategy 
group has the largest number of cells (i.e., an αxβ combination, except for the α=0 column) with 
“6 and above” experiment wins, that strategy can be considered as a successful strategy. If the 
strategy group has more than half of the cells with “6 and above” wins in a table, that strategy 
can be considered as the predominantly successful strategy. Cognitive cooperators have been 
predominantly successful in 4, and successful in 18 (including the 4 predominant successes) of 
the 27 performance tables, especially where k is small. Relational cooperators are found to be 
successful in 3 and success-driven cooperators in only 1 (at N=24, k=20, cyc=10) of the tables. 
Neither RCs nor SCs are observed to be predominantly successful in a table.      
2.5.12. Consistency: Standard Deviation of Invention Performances  
 The consistency of the invention performance is no less important than the magnitude of 
their average counts. If a strategy group is performing best on average, one must check if their 
performance is consistent across its members or if it only creates one or a few star performers. 
Along with the average performance, the standard deviations of the invention counts are 
obtained. Eight standard deviation performance tables are produced at the extreme values of N, k 
and cyc (i.e., N=12,45; k=5,20 and cyc=10, 40).  
 Interesting results are observable in the standard deviation performance tables. The 
following table for the standard deviation of the performances provides an example for three of 
those interesting phenomena (Table 2.16). Note that the winners in this table are the ones who 
produce the smallest standard deviation values among the members of the strategy groups.    
  First of all, the CCs who exhibit high success rates against RCs and SCs in most 
performance tables of the previous section perform poorly in the standard deviation tables (i.e., 
produced high standard deviation values). 
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Table 2.16. Standard deviation of the performances at N=45, k=2 and cyc=40 
β =  
1.0 
CC 4 CC 4 CC 2 CC 2 CC 5 CC 4 
RC 1 RC 3 RC 6 RC 5 RC 2 RC 4 
SC 5 SC 3 SC 2 SC 3 SC 3 SC 2 
0.8 
CC 1 CC 3 CC 2 CC 4 CC 2 CC 4 
RC 5 RC 1 RC 5 RC 3 RC 5 RC 1 
SC 4 SC 6 SC 3 SC 3 SC 3 SC 5 
0.6 
CC 3 CC 1 CC 3 CC 1 CC 3 CC 3 
RC 4 RC 4 RC 2 RC 3 RC 5 RC 3 
SC 3 SC 5 SC 5 SC 6 SC 2 SC 4 
0.4 
CC 5 CC 4 CC 6 CC 3 CC 2 CC 3 
RC 3 RC 6 RC 2 RC 3 RC 3 RC 3 
SC 2 SC 0 SC 2 SC 4 SC 5 SC 4 
0.2 
CC 3 CC 1 CC 4 CC 1 CC 3 CC 1 
RC 4 RC 3 RC 3 RC 3 RC 2 RC 1 
SC 3 SC 6 SC 3 SC 6 SC 5 SC 8 
0.0 
CC 3 CC 1 CC 2 CC 5 CC 2 CC 0 
RC 5 RC 6 RC 4 RC 3 RC 1 RC 3 
SC 2 SC 3 SC 4 SC 2 SC 7 SC 7 
α =  0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 1.0 
 
    When the actual invention counts of CCs are analyzed, the larger standard deviations are 
found to be mostly due to the fact that their group produces one or more leaders in counts. One 
can easily deduce that once a member becomes a star, it usually stays so because SC members 
suddenly create the richness of connectivity. This result, of course, implies that the success rates 
of CCs are not always consistent because they don’t have a high number of wins in standard 
deviation performance tables. This phenomenon will be called “High SD of CCs” to indicate that 
CCs produced high standard deviation values. Note that “High SD of CCs” is represented by lack 
of CCs in a standard deviation performance table. Therefore, Table 2.16 is an example of “High 
SD of CCs”.    
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 Another easily observable phenomenon is the high winning rates of SCs. They do not 
have high success rates in the invention count performance tables but it is understood that they 
produce smaller standard deviations and perform more consistently across members. It is also 
easily observable that the higher wins for SCs (i.e., more experiments that SCs produced the 
smallest standard deviation results) accumulate at the right bottom of the table. In many standard 
deviation performance tables, higher wins for SCs seemed to be correlated with a decrease in β 
although it is not always the case. In some standard deviation performance tables, higher wins 
for SCs correlates with increasing β and sometimes does not correlate at all. These phenomena 
will be called as “β+ on SCs” (higher SCs correlate with increasing β), “β on SCs” (when β effect 
is not certain, that is SC wins accumulate in both ends of β levels or central levels) and “β- on 
SCs” (higher SCs correlates with decreasing β). The underlying reason for why β might be 
affecting is probably the abovementioned phenomenon related to CCs. Because all SCs produce 
connectivity around the most successful member, they probably create invention count results 
very similar among members. Note that only one of the β effects must be observable in a 
standard deviation performance table and Table 2.16 is an example of “β- on SCs”. 
 The last phenomenon in this table is that, although not very strong, some wins by RCs are 
observable. The interesting thing with RC wins is that they usually appear on the left hand side 
of the tables, which may be an indication of a lower α impact on RCs’ standard deviations. 
Lower α impact can be explained in the following way. RCs stick on the same members and 
always bring proposals to them. Because increasing α brings more and more connectivity, the 
higher α can bring RCs more varied connectivity results because the number of connections is 
not bounded at the upper end. On the other hand, lower α brings less and less connectivity results 
and due to the fact that lesser connectivity is bounded by 0 at the lower end, lower α can bring 
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less variability, thus, higher number of RC wins at lower α levels. This phenomenon is called “α- 
on RCs” and Table 2.16 is an example of the phenomenon.  
 Table 2.17 provides the summary of observed phenomena in the standard deviation 
performance tables run for eight different combinations of N, k and cyc. When these phenomena 
are strongly observed, they are indicated with normal text (100% black font color) in the 
corresponding cell. When very weakly observed or not observed at all, they are written with light 
grey text (25% darkness), which means the phenomena is barely there or not there. For example, 
if there is a cell with no normal text (all grey), it means no abovementioned phenomena are 
observed and the standard deviation performance wins for given combination of the parameters, 
N, k and cyc, are similar to a complete random multinomial experiment.  
 
Table 2.17. The main table for the impact on SD performances: Observed phenomena 
  
Number of members in the invention network 
Number of 
cycles 
Number of 
technological domains  
N=12 N=45 
cyc=10 
k=2 
High SD of CCs 
α- on RCs 
β+ on SCs 
β on SCs 
β- on SCs 
High SD of CCs 
α- on RCs 
β+ on SCs 
β on SCs 
β- on SCs 
k=20 
High SD of CCs 
α- on RCs 
β+ on SCs 
β on SCs 
β- on SCs 
High SD of CCs 
α- on RCs 
β+ on SCs 
β on SCs 
β- on SCs 
cyc=40 
k=2 
High SD of CCs 
α- on RCs 
β+ on SCs 
β on SCs 
β- on SCs 
High SD of CCs 
α- on RCs 
β+ on SCs 
β on SCs 
β- on SCs 
k=20 
High SD of CCs 
α- on RCs 
β+ on SCs 
β on SCs 
β- on SCs 
High SD of CCs 
α- on RCs 
β+ on SCs 
β on SCs 
β- on SCs 
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2.6. Conclusions and Discussion 
 This study develops a model for a collaborating network of organizations that are 
motivated to make inventions but use different alliance strategies: cognitive, relational and 
success-driven cooperators. Their invention performance and success rates relating to each other 
are analyzed over an array of parameters. One of the two critical parameters is the level of 
technological dynamism, which forces the organizations to enter a higher number of alliances. 
 The other critical parameter is related to the type of invention that determines whether the 
allies must be at equal levels in their technological knowledge or specialized in their own areas 
and have differences in between their technological knowledge levels. All other parameters are 
related to the system’s operation, like number of members, length of the analysis period and 
number of technological domains.  
 Intuitively, the technological dynamism leads to increased numbers of invention counts 
through higher number of partners, learning and knowledge complementariness effect. The 
simulated model produced increased numbers of invention counts as expected. In addition, 
increases in the technological dynamism did not give a clear competitive advantage to any of the 
strategies. That is, when everything else is kept constant and the technological dynamism is 
increased from minimum to maximum levels, no strategy group gained a superior position over 
the others. 
  The type of invention, however, affected all strategy groups differently. It was initially 
proposed that a cognitive cooperator would perform better relative to others when the invention 
task is decomposable and specialization is allowed. However, most simulations run with various 
system parameters proved that cognitive cooperators gain competitive advantage at 
decomposable tasks. Because cognitive cooperators always find their partners based on the 
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strategy that aims to get rid of inadequacies in their technology levels, they become successful by 
making partnerships with others specialized in their inadequate areas. On the other hand, the 
relational cooperators are suggested to operate best when decomposition of the invention task is 
not possible. RCs base their partnership decisions purely on trust and lose advantage when 
specialization is required for inventions. In many simulation runs applied with different system 
parameters RCs gain competitive advantage when the invention has to be done collectively and 
does not allow specialization of the partners. Although not fully, the model gives some support 
for the initial proposition. Lastly, success-driven cooperators are not expected to suffer from the 
decomposability requirements of the invention task. Success driven cooperators always select 
their partners from the most successful members in invention counts. SCs can be considered as 
the market entrants who actually do not have experience and follow the successful examples to 
make partnership. Making alliances with successful partners allows them to learn, reduce risks 
and, in the meantime, make inventions at moderate levels. The change of invention type neither 
increases nor decreases the success rate of SCs against other cooperators. The simulated model 
strongly proved that increases or decreases in decomposability of the invention task does not 
affect the success rate of SCs against other cooperators.  
 It was initially considered that when the number of organizations in the network 
increased, and similarly, when the number of cycles increased, the expected effects of 
technological dynamism and task decomposability would be strengthened. It turned out that the 
results were affected neither by any change in the number of organizations nor by the number of 
cycles. It can be told that the model is found to be robust, at least for less than or equal to 45 
members of the network and less than or equal to 40 cycles.  
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 The model is also tested for unbalanced number of members in each strategy group in the 
network. It was suggested that even though one strategy group constitutes the majority of the 
members, it would not affect the results regarding the suggested impacts of the technological 
dynamism and the task decomposability. The experiments indicated partial support for this 
hypothesis. Although one of the three experiments did not indicate support, it is still consistent 
with the general results of the experiments with balanced number of members because not all 27 
experiments applied with balanced number of members indicated the impact at the same levels. 
It can be seen that the model operates robustly with an unbalanced number of members among 
the strategy groups.  
 In conclusion, several simulations of the developed model indicated that the most 
effective collaboration strategy is cognitive collaboration. A purely cognitive collaborator 
considers the knowledge integration and learning as priority. The knowledge increase and 
complementariness effect puts the CCs in a competitive position. One of the limitations of the 
model is lack of applicable mixed strategies. It would be interesting to test the success rates of 
some viable mixed strategies. It would also be an interesting extension to do an empirical 
analysis about the various alliance strategies of organizations along with an evaluation of their 
success.  
 The consistency tests indicated some interesting results. In most average invention count 
performance tables, cognitive cooperators dominated in the success rates against the relational 
and success-driven cooperators, especially at higher number of cycles and lower number of 
technological knowledge domains. Success-driven cooperators on the other hand, received the 
lowest success rates among the three strategies. In the eight experiments, designed to determine 
the standard deviation values across the members of the strategy groups, SCs were the ones who 
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produced the lowest values in general. Although success-driven cooperation does not offer the 
high rates of success in terms of invention performances, it suggests consistent results among its 
members. Success-driven cooperation can be identified as the least risky option both because it is 
not affected by the type of invention and because of the consistency of the invention count 
performances.  
 Another interesting observation is regarding the technological dynamism impact on the 
consistency results or relational cooperators. When there is less dynamism, RCs are found to 
produce less standard deviation values across its members’ invention count values. Although the 
invention counts of RCs increase as do those for CCs and SCs, the level of inconsistency also 
increases and apparently faster than other members. 
 This study has a number of limitations. Like all simulation models, this study attempts to 
imitate the real practice and experiment of critical parameters of industry and product types. 
Many factors have been taken into account but obviously many other practical factors were not. 
One of the major assumptions is that the members of the network are treated as though each one 
is equally motivated to make inventions, all the time. Practically, organizations have their unique 
approach towards being “inventive” and it is probably not constant over time. Another practical 
issue in this aspect is that, sometimes inventions produced due to alliances are not equally 
counted among the partners. In practice, there are “hub” organizations that make higher 
investments and although some peripheral allies do specific invention activities, it is the hub 
organization that integrates those specific inventive activities. Secondly, although important, the 
number of invention is probably not a major concern for organizations in practice. It is a 
successful new product or service based on the inventions what matters for most organizations. 
Furthermore, not all inventions have the same value, but in this study, they were treated as if they 
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are equally valuable. Thirdly, one of the model’s assumptions is that members’ information is 
perfectly available to all members of the network, which is not practical even though it is easy to 
access information with recently available technologies. As the last practical issue, the number of 
technological domains has to be kept constant for all members of the network, which is rarely 
true between the collaborating partners.  
 Besides practical issues, there are also technical inadequacies worth mentioning. A 
typical simulation run to produce an invention counts performance table takes from several 
minutes to several hours. Considering that tens of tables had to be produced for the study, the 
parameter values had to be constrained at certain levels. Furthermore, there are more system 
parameters mentioned in the study but included in the analyses. Although a dramatic impact is 
not expected, the impact of lambda (the continuation rate), the number of proposals to the highly 
desired potential partner and the number of proposals to the moderately desired potential partner 
is not considered.   
 Although each of the existing limitations represents an exciting area for future research, 
this study could be extended in several other ways. In the model used, the strategies are defined 
as the sole way of action all throughout the cycles. As mentioned above, a future study may 
define mixed strategies that incorporate some best parts of the existing strategies to better mimic 
the practice and better inform the organizations. Another useful extension can be the learning 
capabilities of the members regarding what strategy to use. Once they observe the system to 
identify what strategy fits best their needs, the members might be given the ability to switch 
across different strategies.  
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CHAPTER 3: 
THE IMPACT OF COLLABORATION NETWORK POSITIONS ON INVENTION 
PERFORMANCE: A SURVEY STUDY IN FLORIDA
1
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
An organization’s surrounding environment provides channels for flow of information, 
knowledge or know-how, all necessary for invention. The relationship network of firms, which 
may be composed of supply chain ties, strategic alliance ties, and social ties constitute conduits 
that allow such an in-and-out flow. Effective collaboration in supply chains (6, 16, 2) and in 
alliances (28, 29, 20, 26) is found to have an important impact on the dynamics of knowledge 
flow. Social network methods are employed to assess the impact of network position on the 
performance outcomes. Although there is limited research, existing studies indicate that an 
individual firm’s position in its own inter-organizational network influences the firm’s 
innovative performance (30, 3, 31, 25, 28, 14, 15, 23). Also, the structure of an entire network 
influences the innovative performance of the entire network (5, 4, 18). 
In social network studies, several metrics have been devised that are applicable to a 
network of individuals. For example, “Degree Centrality” is measured by the number of ties 
connected to an actor in a network. In a research and development (R&D) team of individuals, a 
larger number of networking ties implies more knowledge sharing and thus inventiveness
 
(24). 
                                                 
1
 Portions of this chapter have been previously published in Technology and Innovation, 2012, 
14: 351–363, and have been reproduced with permission from Cognizant Communication Corp.  
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3727/194982412X13500042169171. Image of the written permission 
can be found at Appendix B.  
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However, one cannot be confident enough to say that the impact of the metric ‘degree centrality’ 
applies similarly to organizational networks. An organization also seeks to increase the number 
and enhance the quality of ties (collaborations) but maintaining large numbers of ties is costly. 
Therefore, a firm has to find a balanced strategy that would increase knowledge inflow 
opportunities with the least cost. One of this study’s objectives is to see if centrality measures vs. 
performance of actors similarly apply at the organizational level.  
3.1.1. Metrics to Assess the Network Position and Approaches to Find the Impact  
 The degree centrality is defined as         ∑      where ai is i
th
 actor in the network 
and xij is any existing connection from actor i to j (33). Although not commonly used, it has been 
utilized as an independent variable in Ahuja’s (3) study to assess the effects of a firm’s network 
of relations on innovation. Similarly, Tsai (31) uses it as an independent variable in his study of 
intra-organizational networks in order to assess the effects of network position on business unit 
innovation and performance.  
Closeness centrality is based on closeness or distance to other actors. In network analysis, 
a shortest path between two actors is referred to as geodesic (33). The closeness centrality index 
for actor i is CC(ai) = [∑         
 
   ]
  
 , i ≠ j ; where g is the total number of actors in a 
connected network,          is the number of connections traversed to link actors i and j (27). 
Abbasi et al. (1) uses it by hypothesizing that normalized closeness centrality of a scholar 
impacts her research performance in their study of identifying the effects of co-authorship 
networks on performance of scholars. Uzzi and Spirro (32) use it as a control variable to control 
for the production team’s ability to reach talent in the network of artists in their study on small 
world network of Broadway musicals. 
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A dense connectivity in the neighborhood of the organization can be a critical element of 
an invention process (17). Intense and frequent interaction with other organizations, collective 
problem solving and trust are facilitated by locally clustered networks. The local clustering 
coefficient (LCC) is a measure of locally dense connectivity. It can be calculated as the 
proportion of the partners that are themselves directly linked to each other (28).  
LCCi = 
                             
         
                                                (3.1) 
E is the representation for a set of edges and eij is the edge that connects node vi with 
node vj.    is the immediate neighbors set for organization i, that is defined as    
 {          ⋀      }.  
A counter argument posits that the cohesion in the cluster can cause the knowledge 
shared to become homogenous and redundant, which limits invention performance, as opposed 
to the positive impact view of LCC (13). So there are competing arguments for the impact of 
LCC, which could either result in a positive or negative impact on the invention performance.  
Using patents as the dependent variable has challenges that may result in a potential 
source of bias. For several reasons, the propensity to patent may vary from organization to 
organization. To address this potential bias, Patenting Pattern (PPi) is used as a control variable. 
PPi is calculated as the average number of patents by the organization over the available years 
prior to the beginning of the analysis window (8, 28). PPi is a constant value for each 
organization. It is assumed that it controls the effects of predictors by absorbing uncontrolled 
variation in order to obtain unbiased prediction results. 
For each organization in a network, the cited structural measures can be calculated to see 
their relative positional differences. The main objective of this study is to assess the impact of 
centrality (DC, CC) and clustering (LCC) measures on the innovative performance of 
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organizations (as measured by the number of patents issued) and the resulting practical 
implication for making collaboration decisions.  
Based on the established theoretical constructs, one can expect that organizations have a 
high potential to have good innovation performance, if they have more collaborations 
opportunities, are the closest organizations to all other organizations, are on many shortest 
(geodesic) paths between other pairs of organizations, and are connected with other centrally 
located organizations. That means high performing innovators are in the center of a collaboration 
network. Therefore, the following hypotheses are derived: 
H1: Everything else being equal, degree centrality (DC) of an organization impacts their 
innovation performance. 
H2: Everything else being equal, closeness centrality (CC) of an organization impacts 
their innovation performance. 
H3: Everything else being equal, local clustering coefficient (LCC) of an organization 
impacts their innovation performance. 
The tests of the cited hypotheses regarding the metrics used and their predictive power 
(based on the sample) on innovative performances are discussed in the results section.   
3.1.2. Approaches to the Definition of Network and Connection Types 
One approach to assess the impact of connectivity on performance has been egocentric 
analysis where information is obtained only around an immediate locality of a given 
organization. An egocentric approach does not require a priori enumeration of organizations in a 
network (21). It also does not take into account the complete map of a network, which may lead 
to loss of valuable information regarding interactions among neighbors of egos (29). We targeted 
capturing the map of a whole network with all existing interrelationships among organizations. 
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The boundary of the network is defined as “The inventive organizations located in the State of 
Florida”.   
Another type of approach is to take a single collaboration type into account, for example 
only a specific set of supply chain ties (12) or alliance ties (28) are considered in a network. In 
this study, I approached the notion of collaboration holistically by taking into account all 
possible connections that may allow flow of technological knowledge. Therefore, all types of 
connections below are considered as ‘collaboration’ towards knowledge sharing, when 
organizations report that they have one or more of connections with another organization.   
 Alliance tie: Organization has been in the same trade association or consortia, have 
shared a contractual agreement with another organization. 
 Supplier tie: Organization buys products or services from another organization. 
 Customer tie: Organization sells products or services to another organization. 
 Common ownership: Organization has you has inter-firm cross-holding of equities or 
property rights. 
 Social tie: Organization’s managers/inventors have relatives or friends in another 
organization, excluding the corporate relationships mentioned above. 
Furthermore, collaborative network studies that include universities as inventive entities 
are very limited. Although companies and universities are not pursuing the same exact purposes, 
they are operating in the same environment, constitute a collaboration network and produce 
inventions. I included universities in the study along with the companies, keeping in mind that 
both groups may not be comparable in every aspect. 
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3.1.3. The Outstanding Problem with Collaborations 
Collaborations among organizations are becoming more and more prevalent, but the 
return on the investment of establishing collaboration is very unpredictable. For example, the 
number of top ranked inventions borne from collaborative R&D (rather than in-house R&D) 
increased from 53% in 1975 to 87% in 2006 (8) in the US. While these data show the importance 
of pursuing such relationships, a large percentage of inter-organizational collaborations fail to 
live up to expectations. Most studies estimate that 30 to 70% of all collaborations end up failing 
(23, 7). Therefore, from the standpoint of an organization in the pursuit of innovation, 
collaboration is increasingly necessary, yet difficult. The challenge is not only to determine 
whether or not to collaborate, but with whom and how to collaborate so that innovation is 
increased. This research also aims to contribute to the enhancement of organizations’ 
collaboration decisions. 
 
3.2. Methodology and Data 
3.2.1. Selection of Inventive Organizations 
The boundary of the network is defined as those companies and universities located in 
Florida that have registered at least one patent from 2006 to 2010. The United States Patent and 
Trademark Office’s (USPTO) search facility can pull the list of organizations that have 
registered patents during certain time periods (34). The stated criteria for the boundary returned 
502 organizations. When searching for the list of organizations that have registered patents, the 
USPTO’s search facility returns the results whenever the inventor’s residence is Florida. These 
results, however, included non-Florida based organizations, too. Since Florida based companies 
and organizations are targeted, I had to check all organizations to make sure whether they have 
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an operating business in Florida. The search facility also returns individuals who are not 
affiliated to any organization. These results are excluded from the scope of the study, too, since I 
only focused on the data at the organizational level.  
After exclusions, 298 inventive organizations are left with varying numbers of patents, 
which were called “focal organizations”. For example, the company with the highest number 
(Harris Corp.) registered 315 patents during the stated period and the list goes down to the 
organizations that have 1 registered patent. The high variability in the dependent variable allows 
a more robust regression analysis. From among 298 focal organizations, 270 of them are 
companies from various industries, 14 of them are universities and 19 of them are other public 
institutions. 
3.2.2. Survey Design 
A web-based survey was developed (IRB Pro00002567) to be sent to focal organizations 
to inquire about their collaborative ties among each other. Information regarding collaboration 
ties in the five different categories mentioned above is collected. In the pilot stage, the list of all 
focal organizations are presented to the respondents and they were each asked to indicate if they 
have any relationship with any of the organizations from the list. If respondents cannot identify 
any category of collaboration with any organization in the given list, they are given the 
opportunity to enter the names of organizations with whom they are collaborating. (After the 
pilot stage, I presented a smaller list of random organizations to make it more user friendly for 
respondents.) Newly reported names, of course, constitute a new list of organizations, separate 
from the focal list. I called them no-patent organization in the analysis.  
The survey includes another section, which is related to the innovative characteristics of 
the respondent organizations. They are asked what percentage of their inventions they have been 
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able to commercialize. This would help us to see at what levels patenting is representative of 
innovativeness, that is, new product and service development. Respondents are also asked for 
what percentage of their new products and processes they have registered a patent. There are 
some new products and process that inventor-company or organization wants to keep 
confidential to the extent that they even avoid patent disclosures. The rate that they apply for 
patents for new products and processes would reveal how representative the registered patents 
are for the innovations in general. Finally, they are asked to identify what type of connection 
(supplier, alliance, social, etc.) would impact the new product development efforts most. The 
results of these can give implications for policy makers in order to decide where to invest in the 
development of ties within industrial networks to spur innovation. 
3.2.3. Survey Responses and Sample Representativeness 
A rigorous search was needed to find the contact information of the persons that would be 
able to answer the questions of the survey. The USPTO gives the names of the inventors, 
however, e-mail contacts are not provided. Persons were reached from about half of the focal 
organizations from their websites. Twenty-eight of the focal organizations (about 20% of those 
reached) responded and 21 of them reported their collaboration ties. Figure 3.1 indicates the 
representativeness of the sample by comparing them with the whole set of focal organizations.  
3.2.4. Strength of Connections  
Twenty-one respondents reported 211 connections (any of the five collaboration 
categories listed above) with other focal organizations or with “no-patent” organizations. For 
each reported connection, the respondents are further asked to indicate the significance of the 
connection on the development of the new products and services. The reported significance 
levels of 211 connections are shown in Table 3.1.  
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When a connection is reported at a higher level in its significance on the development of 
the new products and services, it shows that the particular connection has a good potential as a 
conduit for inflow of technological knowledge. Therefore, I was able to validate the approach 
regarding the connection types and network definition by observing the percentage of reported 
significance levels.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. The industrial distribution of the sample compared to all focal organizations 
 
 ‘Very Significant’ or ‘Significant’ connections constitute 54% of all connections. 
Together with ‘Neutral’ category, they constitute 85% of all connections. On the other hand, 
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‘Very significant’ and ‘Insignificant’ categories are not excluded from the study, as they may 
also have the potential for knowledge inflow one would not want to ignore. 
 
Table 3.1. Significance distribution of reported connections 
Reported significance  Number of Connections 
Very significant 59 
Significant 55 
Neutral 66 
Insignificant  13 
Very insignificant 18 
 
3.3. Results 
3.3.1. Network Map 
Organizations are enumerated starting with the focal organizations and continued with the 
no-patent group. Although 21 of the respondents reported connections, there became 51 focal 
organizations in the analysis. This is because the respondents reported connections with some 
other focal organizations that are not respondents to the survey. The respondents reported 
connections with 83 “no-patent” organizations, so in total, 134 organizations are included in the 
network. Figure 2.2 shows the collaboration (as identified by five connection types) network 
map for the sample from Florida’s inventive organizations. Those enumerated up to 51 and 
indicated by circles are focal organizations and those enumerated from 52 to 134 and indicated 
by rounded squares are no-patent organizations.    
 3.3.2. Dependent and Independent Variables 
 In most studies, the dependent variable, patent counts of organizations (PatentCi), 
presents overdispersion and this study is no exception. That is, the response variable has a 
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greater variability than would be assumed in a statistical model. One suggested solution to this 
problem is to use log of raw count values. Using log-counts provides another advantage in 
understanding of any regression model result as well. Because the response and the predictors 
are at similar levels, the regression coefficients would also be easier to interpret. 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Collaboration network of Florida’s inventive organizations 
 
 Although the values for CC and LCC are obtained as normalized values, DC values are 
obtained as raw values. In order to avoid the same issues mentioned for PatentCi‘s, DC values 
are also not used as they are, but log- values are used instead.    
Focal organization 
No-patent organization 
Reported connection 
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 3.3.3. Testing Hypotheses  
Table 3.2 shows the R output for cross-correlations of all variables. The correlation 
coefficients for DC, CC and LCC are at about similar levels and all at high significance levels. 
The hypotheses seemed to be supported by individual correlation values of the sample data. 
These finding seems contradictory to Tsai’s (35) results. On the other hand, the results are 
similar to Abbasi et al.’s (1) study, where their study finds support of the significant correlation 
for especially degree centrality impact on research performance. They also are consistent with 
Ahuja’s (3) results where he works on organizations and uses the same dependent variable as in 
this study. Although the correlations may indicate high association with the patent counts, the 
true impact can be observed only through a regression model where the predictor’s pure impact 
is visible while controlled by all other variables.    
 
Table 3.2. Cross-correlations among variables and their significance values 
 
 
Closeness Centrality (CC) also has a relatively high correlation with Patent Counts (PC). 
Uzzi and Spirro (32) also find a high correlation (based on different models, from 0.527 to 
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0.591) for Closeness Centrality while studying its impact on creativity. On the other hand, 
Abbasi et al. (1) do not find support for Closeness Centrality.  
At this moment, a plot of patent counts versus the predictor variables may give a further 
insight regarding their interactions. Figure 3.3 shows the three predictor variables versus a log of 
patent counts of 51 focal organizations. Although some association is observable, a regression 
model would indicate more accurate impact and its significance. Table 3.3 provides the results 
for the general linear model constructed by the dependent, independent and control variables.  
 
 
Figure 3.3. A plot of (log of) patent counts and predictors 
 
 
3.3.4. Regression Analysis 
 Although the residual distribution is slightly skewed (median -0.33), model significance 
is at a very satisfactory level (2.2e
-16
). Not that the explanatory power of the regression model is 
at moderate levels (Adj-R
2
=0.45). Given the model parameters, DC and CC are found to have a 
significant impact on the patent counts. Although close to an accepted significance level, LCC is 
not found significantly predicting the patent counts.   
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 The analysis results lend support for H1 and H2 but not for H3. Although not very 
strongly significant, DC and CC are found to impact the invention count performance. 
 
Table 3.3. Regression analysis results 
 
  
3.3.5. Innovative Characteristics Analysis 
The responses to invention commercialization, invention patenting and collaboration 
impact on innovation are provided in Figure 3.4., 3.5., and 3.6., respectively.    
 
3.4. Discussion and Conclusion 
I investigated the impact of position in a collaboration network on the innovative 
performance of organizations. Innovative performance is measured by the number of patents 
registered by the organizations and used as response variable in the analyses. An inventive 
organization would seek ways to maximize its technological knowledge inflow opportunities 
using collaborations. Alliance, supplier and customer relationship, common ownership and social 
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connections are specified as a type of collaboration useful for knowledge inflow. A survey 
administered to Florida’s innovating organizations (companies, universities and institutions) that  
 
Figure 3.4. What percentage of your patented inventions have you been able to commercialize? 
 
 
Figure 3.5. For what percentage of your new products and processes have you registered a 
patent? 
 
 
Figure 3.6. The new product development efforts would be positively affected if you could 
establish better/stronger connections with your … ? 
0 1 2 3 4 5
Almost all 80-100%
Majority 60-79%
About Half 40-59%
Less than half 20-39%
Very small portion 0-19%
0 1 2 3
Almost all 80-100%
Majority 60-79%
About Half 40-59%
Less than half 20-…
Very small portion…
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Suppliers
Customers
Alliances
Social connections
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asked them to report their above-listed connections with other Florida based organizations. A 
collaboration networking map is obtained based on the sample of 28 respondents with the help of 
UCINET and NetDraw. In order to validate the assumption regarding the knowledge flow 
potential of reported connections, a further question is asked regarding every reported 
connection’s significance on innovations. 85% of the connections being reported Very 
Significantly, Significantly or Neutrally effecting their new products and services development 
efforts.  
It was proposed that centrality measures indicating central network position in a 
collaboration network—Degree Centrality, Closeness Centrality, and Local Clustering 
Coefficient—play an important role in innovative performance. They are hypothesized to impact 
the invention performance when everything else is kept constant. I obtained the network 
structural measures using R in order to test the hypotheses that high values in centrality and 
clustering metrics indicate higher innovative performance. It suggests that any organization in 
the pursuit of inventive performance must consider that there is a strong impact of being in such 
a position that allows for a closer indirect interaction with other members of the collaboration 
network, besides making high numbers of direct connections.  
The results did not give support for the hypothesis that, local connectivity, as measured 
by local clustering coefficient, has much influence on knowledge recombination and thus 
inventiveness.  
The survey also included a section called “innovative characteristics. The motivation in 
this section was to learn how inventions are translated into innovations and how good the patent 
counts are as the dependent variable. The clearest idea out of the inquiry is that the customer and 
alliance connections have a stronger impact on the efforts of new product and service 
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development. It is further observable that, manufacturing oriented enterprises tend to see 
customer connections as more important in new product and process development. The results 
also indicate that as opposed to the other collaboration ties, customer and alliance connections 
have a stronger impact on the efforts of new product and service development. 
The sample size of the study is one of the limitations of this study. In this regard, I was 
not able to do industry specific analyses. Since a local industry is studied, the generalizability of 
the results is likely to be limited. With a further study that could capture the networking map of a 
larger set of organizations, industry specific analysis could be employed. The contribution of this 
study is to show the impact of network position in a holistic collaboration network. The results 
from the sample pointed to the influence of two of the network measures.  
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CHAPTER 4: 
THE IMPACT OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R&D) ALLIANCE NETWORK 
POSITIONS ON INVENTION PERFORMANCE: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY  
 
4.1. Introduction 
Empirical research widely confirmed that the positional variables in inter-organizational 
alliance networks influence the invention performance outcomes (30, 15, 34, 1, 37, 28, 33, 29, 
10, 14, 17, 4, 9). However, the combination of the positional variables used in such research, and 
the direction and magnitude of their impact, are as varied as the number of studies. Recent 
studies are diversified in their attempts to explore the impact of specific elements of network 
impact. For example, whether the knowledge that is fundamental to the invention is tacit or 
codified (12, 2), whether the cognitive distance between partners is large or small (13, 26, 19), 
and whether the positional distance to other members of the network and clustering levels are 
high or low (33, 29, 14, 1) are each found to play an important role in inventiveness.  
This research studies the impact of the positional distance measures and the local 
clustering by using longitudinal data of a large-scale alliance network (see 33 for discussion) in 
the form of multifold alliances (as opposed to a binary assumption). Research endeavors in this 
sub-area mostly examine a single industry (1, 29, 15). One exception is Schilling and Phelps (33) 
who analyzed 11 high-technology manufacturing industries. Due to the nature of their data, 
however, the researchers usually had to make a strong assumption regarding the estimation of the 
alliance life. In contrast, this research uses Research and Production Joint Venture (RJV) alliance 
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data based on the notices of National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993 
(NCRPA) (35, 25), which provides information regarding both the beginning and ending time of 
any organization’s membership to a RJV since 1994. Considering the membership as 
connectivity among the members of the RJV in NCRPA notices, it is possible to relieve the usual 
assumption regarding when an alliance exists and ceases to exist.  
Another restriction the previous research encountered was that the alliances had to be 
treated as binary (i.e., un-weighted) ties. That is, when at least one alliance is announced the tie 
weight is counted as 1, and otherwise it is counted as 0. This approach, however, ignores the 
potential multiple connections in-between organizations. It is likely that two organizations may 
be involved in more than one RJV simultaneously, which is not the same as being in one single 
RJV simultaneously. The number of common alliances for two organizations is translated as tie 
weights in network analysis. Therefore, it becomes a matter of taking the “weight” value of the 
connection as 1, or the actual number of alliances. A recent social network study from Opsahl et 
al. (27) proposes calculation methods for network centrality and local clustering measures in 
weighted networks. The empirical research has not yet examined the potential differences in 
calculations of network positional variables that take tie weights into account, which may well 
affect the direction and the magnitude of the impact on the invention performance. Using the 
membership information for RJV in the NCRPA notices, it is possible to relieve the binary 
assumption and take multifold alliances into account by using this proposed calculation method 
(27).        
To address the abovementioned gap, the impact of two key large-scale network centrality 
properties (degree centrality and closeness) and local clustering (the term crowding is also used 
by Stuart, 1998 (34)) is examined on invention output.  
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4.1.1. Inter-organizational Networks and Patents as Invention Output 
One of the definitions for invention is the novel recombination or the reconfiguration of 
the ways in which knowledge elements are linked. In explaining the process of invention, I adopt 
the perspective of recombination and selection of ideas via communication through a network of 
interconnected organizations (33, 24). To solve an industrial problem, two or more organizations 
decide to come together and form alliances in a venture or project. As more organizations are 
added to them, or the incumbent members of the alliance decide to form other unique alliances, 
they weave a network of such alliances. From the network science perspective, organizations are 
represented as nodes and their communication channels due to being in the same venture/project 
are represented as connections (i.e., ties). Note that if there are two members in a RJV, it means 
one (undirected) connection is created between the two organizations. When there are three 
members, three connections are created between the three members. For four members, six 
connections are created. So, the number of connections created for a given RJV is obtained by 
the following formula, where n is the number of members in the RJV:  
Number of Connections = 
      
 
                                              (4.1) 
Patent counts are shown to correlate with invention counts (3) and provide a measure of 
novel invention (19). Numerous studies elect to use patent counts as a proxy for invention 
performance. Using patents, though, has a few challenges that may result in a potential source of 
bias. Firstly, for several reasons, the propensity to patent may vary from organization to 
organization. To address this potential bias, I control for the Patenting Pattern (PP) variable that 
is the average number of patents by the organization over the available years prior to the 
beginning of the analysis window (6, 33).  
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Secondly, organizations that enter the analysis time window with different knowledge 
stocks may be expected to perform differently, which constitutes another source of bias. Another 
interpretation could be the following: An organization that has successfully registered a patent 
can be expected to have a tendency to register further patents in the same area. To control for this 
phenomenon, a Knowledge Stock Effect (KSE) variable is used. KSE is calculated as the 
depreciated sum of past inventions and it assumes a different value every year in longitudinal 
analysis (6).  
The US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) provides the counts of yearly utility 
patent grants from 1969 to 2012 by organizations (39). This source provides the granted patents 
for the organizations that are the sole owner or the first-named assignee. The dependent variable, 
Patentsit, is the number of registered patents for organization i at year t.  
Since the analysis window start at 1994 and the patent data is available from 1969, the 
PP value can be calculated for each member on the network over 26 years as: 
PPi = 
∑         
    
    
  
                                                        (4.2) 
Similarly, the Knowledge Stock Effect for each member at year t is calculated as: 
KSEit =                                                                 (4.3) 
   is called the depreciation rate and the value of 30% is found to be appropriate (6).   
4.1.2. Centrality and Clustering Measures 
In a network of alliances, the greater the access an organization has to novel knowledge, 
the better its chances are for making an invention. Access to other members is measured by 
centrality metrics. One of the primary metrics is the degree centrality (DC), which counts the 
number of connections from (or to, as connections are undirected) an organization: 
     ∑                                                                   (4.4) 
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    is the degree centrality value for i
th
 organization, and xij is any existing connection 
from actor i to j (40).     is a measure of direct contacts but it is known that the diffusion of 
knowledge also takes place via indirect contacts (27, 4, 7). Closeness centrality (CC) measures 
the inverse network distance to all other members of the network. Before moving further into the 
calculation of CC, another important network concept, geodesic, must be introduced. Geodesic 
refers to the shortest path between the two nodes in a network (40). The CC, then is the inverse 
of the summation of the geodesics from an organization i to any other organization j in the 
network. The geodesic distance is represented as        (28). 
CCi = [∑        ]
  
 , i ≠ j ;                                              (4.5) 
Some critical elements of an invention process, like intense and frequent interaction with 
other organizations, collective problem solving and trust are facilitated by a dense connectivity in 
the neighborhood of the organization (11). The local clustering coefficient (LCC) is a measure of 
locally dense connectivity. It can be calculated as the proportion of the partners that are 
themselves directly linked to each other (33).  
LCCi = 
                             
         
                                                (4.6) 
E is the representation for a set of edges and eij is the edge that connects node vi with 
node vj.    is the immediate neighbors set for organization i, that is defined as    
 {          ⋀      }.  
As opposed to the positive impact view of LCC, a counter argument posits that the 
cohesion in the cluster can cause the knowledge shared to become homogenous and redundant, 
which limits invention performance (8). So there are competing arguments for the impact of 
LCC, which could either result in a positive or negative impact on the invention performance.  
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The hypotheses from H1 to H3b follow: 
H1: Higher standardized degree centrality (DC) is associated with higher invention 
performance. 
 H2: Higher standardized closeness centrality (CC) is associated with higher invention 
performance. 
 H3a: Higher local clustering coefficient (LCC) is associated with higher invention 
performance. 
 H3b: Higher local clustering coefficient (LCC) is associated with lower invention 
performance. 
4.1.3. Calculation of Variables in Weighted Networks 
 In social network analysis, the strength (weight) of a tie is explained as a function of 
factors such as the tie’s intensity or the amount of services exchanged (18). The fact that the 
strength of ties is not taken into account is a major limitation in studying large-scale networks 
(27). It is quite common organizations become members in more than one RJV simultaneously. 
The intensity and the amount of technological knowledge exchange between two organizations 
may differ if they share one RJV in common versus twenty-one
1
. Opsahl et al. (27) proposes a 
tuning parameter, say   (from 0 to 1), to set the relative importance of one tie (i.e., un-weighted) 
as compared to multiple ties (i.e., full weight is considered). When the parameter value is 0, the 
multiple connections between the two members are taken as just one. This is the binary 
assumption and completely ignores the tie strengths. When the parameter value is set to 1, the 
measure is based on the tie weights completely. That is, each common membership in between 
two organizations’ multiple connections must be treated like all other connections in the 
                                                 
1
 It is observed that there are up to 21 common RJVs in NCRPA-1993 data. 
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network. Figure 4.1. illustrates an example of the function of the tuning parameter in a simplified 
network of two RJVs. Assume that firms A, B and C come together to solve an industrial 
problem and establishes an RJV. Similarly, B, C and other two firms E and D decide to establish 
another RJV. Now, all connections can be considered to have strength 1, except for the one in 
between B and C. It could be treated as 1, 2 or somewhere in between when adjusted by α 
parameter.    
 
 
Figure 4.1. An example of the function of the tuning parameter α 
  
 Although the tuning parameter here is discussed on the measurement of degree centrality, 
the same approach applies to the measurement of closeness centrality and the local clustering 
coefficient as well. As Opsahl et al. (27) find significant changes in the metric values in various 
example networks, the magnitude of the impact of the network variables in this study is expected 
to be moderated by the tuning parameter. The three hypotheses follow:      
H4a: The tuning parameter for calculation of standardized degree centrality (DC) 
moderates its impact on invention performance. 
H4b: The tuning parameter for calculation of standardized closeness centrality (CC) 
moderates its impact on invention performance. 
 
A 
C 
B 
 
A 
C 
B 
D 
E 
1 or 2? 
 
 
Tie weight = 1, when α = 0 
                  = 2, when α = 1 
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H4c: The tuning parameter for calculation of local clustering coefficient (LCC) 
moderates its impact on invention performance. 
 
4.2. Data 
4.2.1. Selection of the Organizations 
In order to test the hypotheses, a balanced fixed-panel data set is constructed for 63 U.S. 
organizations
2
 from 1994 to 2012. A prior enumeration of organizations is made to be able to 
observe each individual organization’s network and patent data in a longitudinal analysis. Panel 
data models are more efficient than cross-sections or pooling cross sections data, since the 
observations of the same individual organizations over several time points reduce the variance 
with respect to random selections of individuals over the same period.  
The choice of organizations was particularly important for two reasons: I intended to 
capture the greatest possible variability in the dependent variable, (Patentsit), across the 
organizations. Also, the intention is to select such a group so that I can include as large an 
amount of network activity as possible in order to capture the highest technological knowledge 
flow potential through the alliances. The patent count data available from USPTO provides 
several grouping options, including by organization for every year (39). Choosing the 
organizations with the highest number of patent counts serves both purposes, because there is a 
good variability in patent counts and the organizations at the top tend to make alliances among 
                                                 
2
 The list is primarily composed of companies (58 of them) although there are a few public 
institutions (3 of them) and universities (2 of them). I opt to keep the public institutions and 
universities as the members of the network. The purpose of their existence in the network fits 
with the previously given definitions and the assumptions.  
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themselves mostly
3
. Since the analysis period is defined from 1994 to 2012 (due to the NCRP 
Act of 1993), the organizations are sorted based on which were granted the most number of 
patents from 1994 to 2012. USPTO makes no attempt to combine data based on subsidiary 
relationships. I opted to combine all branches or subsidiaries into one parent company that has a 
distinct headquarters
4
. Their listings are merged and the number of patents are summed up 
accordingly
5
. After the combining process, the organizations that were granted a total of 2000+ 
patents from 1995
6
 to 2012 were selected and enumerated for analysis (63 of them)
7
. Therefore I 
obtained a balanced panel-data of the dependent variable, (Patentsit), for all organizations, from 
1995 to 2012.    
4.2.2. Alliance Network Data 
National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993 (NCRPA) is a U.S. federal 
law that establishes a rule of reason for evaluating the antitrust implications of Research Joint 
                                                 
3
 The alliance data confirm this statement. For example, in 2012, the number of alliances (i.e., 
common memberships detected, see 2.1.1. for details) that top-20 organizations (organizations 
that were granted the most number of patens in 2012) make among themselves is 1,351. The 
number of alliances that top-20 organizations make with the next-20 organizations (that are 
organizations from 21 to 40) is 583. That means, a sample of organizations at the top make 
around 2.5 times more alliances among themselves than they make alliances with the sample of 
the same size nearest to the top. The same phenomenon is observed in all other years (e.g., the 
ratio is 5.0 in 1994).        
4
 For example, the AT&T Corporation’s patents were listed under its name “AT&T Corporation” 
until 2007. Starting 2008, they were mostly listed under another name “AT&T Intellectual 
Property, L.P.”. Some companies had several subsidiaries and branches (14 lines merged for 
Siemens).     
5
 Naturally, some of the companies make mergers, cease to exist or newly emerge over the 18-
year analysis period. I tried to include the organizations that represent a network membership at 
best. For example, Sun Microsystems has been acquired by Oracle in 2010. I included both 
Oracle and Sun in the analysis because Sun has been a member in the majority of the analysis 
period. However, as this is an obvious limitation the individual results like Sun must be 
evaluated by caution.       
6
 The counts in 1994 are excluded for the reasons of causality. Simply, the (earliest) alliance 
network structure of 1994 is not expected to impact the patents registered in 1994.  
7
 The complete list can be found in Appendix C.  
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Ventures (RJVs) on an individual case basis and reduces potential antitrust liabilities (25), and is 
designed to promote innovation, facilitate trade, and strengthen the competitiveness of U.S. firms 
and institutions. The establishment of an RJV and updated membership listings are publicly 
announced in the Federal Register (FR). Through the FR search facility NCRPA notices can be 
searched specifically (16). After collecting all NCRPA notices in a specific year, I combined all 
the documents and highlighted whenever one of the 63 organizations was cited for any reason. 
Figure 4.2. is an example of a highlighted NCRPA notice that announces the membership listings 
on December 2, 1999, in which I capture information for four of the 63 organizations.   
 
 
Figure 4.2. An example of an NCRPA notice.  
 
Given the information from Figure 4.2. only, the four organizations (i.e., AT&T, Hewlett 
Packard, Lucent and Microsoft) are considered completely connected. Therefore, I define n(n-
1)/2 = 6 single undirected connections among them. If any of the two from the four happens to 
be announced in another RJV in 1999, then I define another connection in between the two. So, 
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there becomes two undirected alliance connections between them. For every year, up to 150 
notices are merged, lines highlighted when one of the 63 organizations is cited and analyzed for 
the common membership. They are not only cited for membership announcements, but also for 
withdrawals, mergers or any other actions of interest. In a withdrawal case, the connections 
defined for a particular RJV are omitted.       
The connections are handled by forming adjacency matrices in MS Excel
8
. 
After the formation of adjacency matrices for every year, I obtained the balanced panel-
data for the independent variables and control variables.       
 
4.3. Model Specification 
Panel data allows control for variables that cannot be observed or measured. In this study, 
they account for individual heterogeneity across organizations and time effects. A number of 
strategies are employed to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Patenting Pattern (PP) is an 
example to control for unobserved individual firm effects. PP is employed to control for 
unobserved, temporally constant differences in patenting across organizations. Furthermore, the 
Knowledge Stock Effect (KSE) is introduced to serve control for unobserved differences in 
organizations’ knowledge stocks. It is also important to consider appropriate lag structure of the 
independent variables against the dependent variable. Apparently, today’s network positional 
variables is very unlikely to impact the invention outputs of the same year. For this reason, I 
                                                 
8
 At first, I created columns for all RJVs and rows for all organizations. Whenever a common 
membership is detected of four organizations in an RJV, say in 1999, I wrote “99” in the 
corresponding cells in the intersections of the particular RJV and the organizations. COUNTIFS 
function with the criterion “99” collects the number of common memberships in between any 
two organizations, which, in fact, becomes the value of the corresponding cell in the adjacency 
matrix. 
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select to estimate models using one-year, two year and three year lags (33). I will also have a 
chance to explore the robustness of the regression model.  
There are two prominent regression models suggested in the literature for panel data 
structure. Based on the different approaches to control for unobserved heterogeneity, the Fixed 
Effect (FE) Model is applied whenever the analysis of the impact of variables that vary over time 
are of interest. The underlying assumption in FE model is correlation between the observed 
entity’s error term and the predictor variables (36). The Random Effect (RE) Model, however, 
requires that the error term is uncorrelated with the predictor variables and variation across 
entities are assumed random. This assumption allows for time-invariant variables to play a role 
as explanatory variables, which are already specified above. As I do not have any prior belief on 
what assumption to be made, both FE and  RE models are to be applied. Since the hypothesized 
predictors are degree centrality (DC), closeness centrality (CC) and local clustering coefficient 
(LCC) add the control variables are PP and KSE, the model can be specified as follows: 
Patentit+1 , Patentit+2 , Patentit+3 = f(DCit , CCit, LCCit, FEi, KSEit )            (4.7) 
  
4.4. Results 
4.4.1. Descriptive Results 
 In order to start with an accurate description of the networks and the data, a series of 
descriptive results are presented before the test of hypotheses. From 1994 to 2012, the names of 
63 organizations were cited at least one time in one of the 371 RJVs analyzed. Each year’s 
network map is obtained using network adjacency matrices, which are constructed based on the 
common membership information in RJVs. Figure 4.4 presents an example map from the most 
recent (2012) alliance network, obtained from UCINET and NetDraw (7). Both pictures are 
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different representation of the same network. The top figure lists the four organizations without 
any connections in the top-left corner. The bottom figure on the other hand, lists all organizations 
with less than 5 connections. Therefore, the organizations constituting the circle at the bottom 
have 5 or more connections. As the Federal Register is a publicly open source, I felt no 
restriction to give the names of the companies and institutions but they are mostly abbreviated 
for the purposes of analyses.     
  
 
 
    
Figure 4.3. The alliance network map from 2012 
 The connection data obtained from notifications between 1994 to 2012 is accumulated 
into a 63x371 matrix. Each cell contains information regarding when the organization entered the 
corresponding venture, if ever it did, when ceased membership, when re-joined, etc. over 19 year 
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period. Although most cells in the matrix is empty, the information in the cells provide the 
membership history over 19 years. Therefore, the matrix is extended towards another dimension 
that indicate years. Consequently, a three-dimensional array is obtained, which allow for several 
interesting analyses regarding the RJVs and the organizations.    
 Table 4.1 provides some descriptive characteristics of the networks across the years. For 
the 63 organizations analyzed, the average number of alliances peaked in 2005, then slightly 
decreased. Interestingly, the percentage of the members in the main network component assumes 
its smallest values in the late 90s and then enters a never-decreasing trend.   
Table 4.1. Descriptive characteristics of the alliance networks 
Years 
Avg. number of 
alliances per 
organization 
Percentage in 
main network 
component 
Number of members (among 63) in the largest 
RJV 
1994 7.0 0.73 16 Open Software Foundation 
1995 11.2 0.81 18 Open Software Foundation 
1996 13.6 0.84 18 Open Software Foundation 
1997 17.2 0.71 18 Open Software Foundation 
1998 21.7 0.64 18 Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) Forum 
1999 25.4 0.60 18 Open Software Foundation 
2000 35.1 0.78 24 Infiniband Trade Association 
2001 36.0 0.78 24 Infiniband Trade Association 
2002 36.5 0.79 24 Infiniband Trade Association 
2003 37.1 0.92 24 Infiniband Trade Association 
2004 38.1 0.92 24 Infiniband Trade Association 
2005 45.0 0.94 24 Infiniband Trade Association 
2006 40.2 0.94 24 Infiniband Trade Association 
2007 39.5 0.94 24 Infiniband Trade Association 
2008 39.4 0.94 24 Infiniband Trade Association 
2009 38.7 0.94 24 Infiniband Trade Association 
2010 37.5 0.94 24 Infiniband Trade Association 
2011 39.3 0.94 24 Infiniband Trade Association 
2012 39.0 0.94 24 Infiniband Trade Association 
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Another interesting results of the membership information is the analysis average length 
of affiliation with an RJV. The organizations vs. RJV matrix (63x371) has 19 layers in the 3
rd
 
dimension and for each cell of (63x371) matrix, a calculation through the 3
rd
 dimension can be 
made to find an organization’s years of affiliation to an RJV. Using this method, a (63x371) 
matrix of a number of affiliation years is obtained. In fact, this important information was one of 
the motivation for this study where previous literature had to make assumption regarding the 
duration of alliances. Average number of affiliation years is obtained both averaging across 
organizations, which finds average number of years an RJV keeps an organization (a vector of 
371 elements), and averaging across RJVs, which also finds average number of years an 
organization stays with an RJV (a vector of 63 elements). Essentially, either one has the same 
meaning. Since their histogram plots give similar pictures, one of them is provided in Figure 4.4. 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Frequencies for average number of years an organization stays with an RJV  
 
The horizontal axis shows the number of years and the vertical axis shows the 
frequencies of the average durations of stay. Note that, these results are obtained from a sample 
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of highly successful set of organizations. Although studies estimate that 30 to 70% of all 
alliances end up failing to serve the purpose (23, 5), the above results are more likely to be 
representative of effective RJVs.   
4.4.2. Correlational Analyses 
Based on the 19 membership matrices, an adjacency matrix is obtained for every year 
using MsExcel’s COUNTIFS function9. The adjacency matrices (63x63) are transferred to R-
Studio (40) environment for the following analyses. For each year, besides Patentit data, DC, CC 
and LCC data are also calculated. DC, CC and LCC data are obtained as normalized values. In 
order to reduce overdispersion in Patentit data, literature suggest making analyses using log- 
values. It also brings dependent variable values to similar digit levels with predictors, which is an 
advantage in interpretations of regression coefficients that is discussed in the following section.    
In order to allow a better insight regarding how predictor variables correlates with the 
patent counts, a longitudinal plot is obtained for each predictor variable. Since there are 63 
organizations and it is impractical to include all in one plot, a representative set of 4 companies 
are shown in Figure 4.5. Note that the degree centralities (the plot at the top) make peak values at 
2005 and drops afterwards, consistently with the information in the Table 4.1. It is also 
noticeable that there is very small variation in LCC, which does not seem to highly correlate with 
Patents.  
Instead of pooling the data over the years, the correlation values for all organizations are 
obtained on yearly basis due to a potentially unobserved variability over the years. 
 
                                                 
9
 For every cell of each adjacency matrix, the COUNTIFS function checks the two 
corresponding rows (of the two organization that is represented in the cell) of the (63x371) 
membership matrix.   
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Figure 4.5. Longitudinal plots for DC, CC and LCC versus Patents for selected sample 
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Each year’s correlation values for six pairs (DC vs. Patents, CC vs. Patents, LCC vs. 
Patents, DC vs. CC, DC vs. LCC, CC vs. LCC) are obtained and only minimum and maximum 
values are presented here. Table 4.2 presents the maximum (at the top) and the minimum (at the 
bottom) of all years’ correlation values between the variables. Besides the correlation values, the 
year of maximum and minimum value is also presented nearby.  
 
Table 4.2. Maximum and minimum correlation values of the variables 
 Patentit+1 DCit CCit LCCit 
Patentit+1 1 
 
 
  
DCit 
0.667  DC,2005vsP,2006 
-0.029 DC,2011vsP,2012 
1   
CCit 
0.595  CC,2005vsP,2006 
-0.022 DC,2011vsP,2012 
0.963 CC,2003vsDC,2003 
0.899 CC,2004vsDC,2004 
1  
LCCit 
0.340 LCC,2005vsP,2006 
-0.0645 LCC,2006vsP,2007 
0.481 LCC,2003vsDC,2003 
0.110 CC,2010vsDC,2010 
0.750 LCC,1994vsDC,1995 
0.544 LCC,2009vsDC,2010 
1 
 
Big variances are noticeable between the minimum correlation values over the years. The 
only exception is the DC-CC correlation, where their correlation is found to be quite high, even 
at the minimum year. This, actually brings up another issue towards the model construction. 
Originally, DC, CC and LCC were to be used in the same regression model, however, DC and  
CC cannot be used together. Instead, two separate models are constructed. One model uses DC, 
LCC and DCxLCC interaction effect as predictors, the other one uses CC, LCC and CCxLCC 
interaction effect as predictors. Also, KSE is found to be so highly correlated with patents (up to 
r=0.98) that the random effect model could have fail to find the predictors’ impact. I re-estimated 
the models using PP instead of both PP and KSE and constructed the Fixed Effect and Random 
Effect Models.  
The following two plots show the heterogeneity across the organizations and across the 
years, which lays the basis for the assumptions to use the FE and RE models. Figure 4.6 shows 
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both plots where at the top, the boxplots for 63 organizations’ response variable (Patentsit) are 
presented and at the bottom, the boxplots for 18 years’ response variables are presented. 
Heterogeneity across organizations are controlled and across time-factor will be checked by 
another model.   
  
 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Heterogeneity in response variable across organizations and years 
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4.4.3. Regression Analyses 
The two regression model results of the model DC, LCC and DCxLCC using FE and RE 
models are provided in Table 4.3. In the fixed effect model, both DC and LCC are found to have 
a significant positive impact whereas in the random effect model, the impact of DC is found to 
be not significant. The F-statistic ensures that the coefficients in the model are different than 
zero.  
Table 4.3. Fixed effect and random effect regression summary for DC, LCC and DCxLCC 
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The two regression model results of the model CC, LCC and CCxLCC using FE and RE 
models are provided in Table 4.4. In the fixed effect model, both CC and LCC are found to have 
a significant positive impact whereas in the random effect model, the impact of LCC is found to 
be in the borderlines of accepted significance. An interesting results, perhaps different thatn the 
previous two outputs is that the interaction effect (CCxLCC) is found to have a significant 
negative impact. Another interesting result is that the coefficient value of CC is quite high. For 
every unit of increase in the normalized CC value, the expected increase in the log of Patents is 
almost at the level of 4. The F-statistics in both models ensure that the coefficients in the model 
are different than zero. 
Although both FE and RE models indicated similar outputs, the variations between the 
outputs are no negligible. The question is remaining for which one must be used to explain the 
impact level of the predictors. To decide between FE and RE models a “Hausman test” is applied 
for preferred model. It basically tests the fundamental difference between the two models: Are 
errors are correlated with the regressors? The null hypothesis is that the random effect is 
preferred, only a significant correlation result leads to the rejection of RE model. Table 4.5 
shows the results of  the “Hausman test” where fixed effect models is the preference in both  DC, 
LCC and DCxLCC and CC, LCC and CCxLCC models. 
As mentioned above, I can apply a further test to see if time fixed effects are needed. In a 
model where time factor is introduced, and the impact of predictors are controlled for. Each 
year’s coefficient absorbs the heterogeneity do to time difference. Table 4.6 gives the results for 
time-fixed effects model. It is observable that the impact levels (the coefficient values and the 
significances) are intensified by controlling for years. The two tests, F test and Lagrange 
Multiplier tests that tells the necessity of the time-fixed effects (Table 4.7). 
 98 
Table 4.4. Fixed effect and random effect regression summary for CC, LCC and CCxLCC 
 
 
 
   
Table 4.5. Results of Hausman tests 
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Table 4.6. Results for time-fixed effect model 
 
  
Table 4.7. Tests for time-fixed effect model 
 
 
Significant effects from the F test and Lagrange Multiplier tests tells that it is necessary 
to use the time-fixed effects. 
4.4.4. Robustness for Tie Weight and Patentit+2 , Patentit+3  Models 
As the last piece of analyses, the results are re-estimated using different method of 
calculation for the predictor variables and different models.  
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Although it was hypothesized that the calculation methods to moderate the impact of the 
predictor variables, the correlation results of the Table 4.8 does not prove the claim. The 
correlation values in Table 4.8 are calculated by using un-weighted ties (binary method) whereas 
table whereas the correlation values are calculated by using weighted ties in Table 4.2.     
 
 
Table 4.8. Maximum and minimum correlation values using non-weighted calculation method 
 Patentit+1 DCit CCit LCCit 
Patentit+1 1 
 
 
  
DCit 
0.508  DC,2005vsP,2006 
0.012 DC,2011vsP,2012 
1   
CCit 
0.504  CC,2005vsP,2006 
0.035 DC,2011vsP,2012 
0.891 CC,2002vsDC,2002 
0.847 CC,2004vsDC,2004 
1  
LCCit 
0.301 LCC,1995vsP,1996 
-0.152 LCC,2005vsP,2006 
0.361 LCC,1994vsDC,1995 
0.108 CC,2009vsDC,2009 
0.661 LCC,1994vsDC,1995 
0.307 LCC,2009vsDC,2010 
1 
 
All the previous analysis (longitudinal plots, heterogeneity and regression analyses) are 
applied using the calculated predictors (DC, CC and LCC) that adopts the approach taking into 
account weights of connections. Interesting enough, predictor variable values from both 
calculation methods are so close that they did not affect the model estimation results 
significantly. In fact, the overall correlation coefficient between the values of Table 4.2 and 
Table 4.7 is calculated as r=0.952. Therefore, I did not present the other results with the non-
weighted predictor values as they are very similar with the current calculations.    
 
4.5. Discussion and Conclusions 
 This study analyzes the impact of the degree centrality, closeness centrality and local 
clustering coefficient of an alliance network of research and development joint ventures on the 
network members’ invention performances. Research and Production Joint Venture (RJV) 
alliance data based on the notices of National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993 
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(NCRPA) which provides information regarding which organization has been a member of an 
RJV. Memberships in RJV are translated to the connectivity among the members of the RJV and 
subsequently, relationship maps are obtained.  
 It has been argued that high quantities of opportunities for technological knowledge 
inflow availability (DC) should facilitate greater invention counts. Similarly, the availability of 
diverse information in a close range (CC) must also facilitate greater invention counts. There are 
two competing arguments  regarding locally dense pockets (LCC), which is sometimes seen as 
redundant hindering the novel knowledge creation but some studies suggested its ability for 
transmission capacity increase. Its facilitation of technological knowledge inflow and invention 
counts is also tested. Both the correlational analyses and regression model results indicated 
strong support for the impact of initial two arguments. The impact of clustering has also been 
visible but only after controlling for time variable, which is found to be the most viable model 
among all. These results are consistent with much of the theory developed in recent literature (1, 
33).  They are consistent with Schilling and Phelp’s argument that combination of clustering and 
reach (another measure for the availability of diverse information in a close range) is associated 
with significantly higher invention performance. The results also have similar indications with 
Ahuja’s findings regarding the negative interaction between the direct and indirect ties.    
 Another question of interest was the calculation method of these network positional 
metrics. One of the two main methods of calculation for all three metrics is using a binary 
approach and count only one tie even though there are more than bilateral connections. The other 
method is taking as many bilateral connections as there exist. Although my argument was that 
calculation of the two different methods arises significant discrepancies, an extremely high 
correlation is observed in both calculation methods, which did not affect the results significantly. 
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This result, however, indicates a contradictory picture with Opsahl’s (27) examples of significant 
changes due to different calculation methods. The underlying conditions that lead to very similar 
outcomes calls for a more detailed analysis.  
 Along with the methodological contributions, this study also investigated important 
information like the number of alliances an organization is involved and duration of membership 
in alliances. The results add to this literature by suggesting that membership to successful 
research and development joint ventures last a little more than 10 years on the average based on 
the information from NCRPA database. This research also made visible the historical trends 
regarding alliance membership from 1994 to 2012.  
 This research also have several limitations. The findings may be influenced by the 
assumption that RJVs announced at Federal Register are representative of all existing RJVs. The 
results might have been biased if alliances in practice are more sparse, lasing shorter times. A 
strong assumption that follows is the equal treatment of all alliances. Different types of RJVs and 
different types of bilateral communications relationships may lead to significantly variant levels 
of facilitation for technological knowledge sharing. Although the strength is defined by the 
number of common memberships, I did not address the governance structure and the scope of the 
relationships. Although the sample that I worked exhibits high connectivity and represent the 
core of high invention performance organizations, it still constitutes a very small fraction of the 
existing organizations. Each of these limitations can be considered exciting areas for future 
research endeavor.   
 
  
 103 
4.6. References 
 
1. Ahuja G. Collaboration Networks, Structural Holes, and Innovation: A Longitudinal Study. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 45(3): 425-455; 2000. 
 
2. Audretsch D.B., Feldman M.P. Innovative Clusters and the Industry Life Cycle. Review of 
Industrial Organization 11: 253-273; 1996. 
 
3. Basberg B.L. Patents and the measurement of technological change: A survey of the 
literature. Research Policy 16; 131-141; 1987. 
 
4. Beaudry C., Schiffauerova A. Impacts of collaboration and network indicators on patent 
quality: The case of Canadian nanotechnology innovation. European Management Journal 
29, 362– 376; 2011. 
 
5. Bleeke, J.; Ernst, D. Is Your Strategic Alliance Really a Sale? Harvard Business Review 
73(1): 97–105; 1995. 
 
6. Blundell, R. R., R. Griffith, J. Van Reenen. Dynamic count data models of technological 
innovation. Econom. J. 105 333–344; 1995. 
 
7. Borgatti, S. P.; Everett M. G.; Freeman L. C. UCINET for Windows: Software for social 
network analysis. Harvard, Analytic Technologies; 2002. 
 
8. Burt R. S. Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition; Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press; 1992. 
 
9. Caliskan F., Reeves K.A., Ozcan O., Zeller D. The impact of collaboration network Position 
on innovative performance. Technology and Innovation, Vol. 14, pp. 351–363, 2012.  
 
10. Chiu Y.T.H. How network competence and network location influence innovation 
performance. Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing. 24/1 46–55; 2009.  
 
11. Coleman, J. S. Social capital in the creation of human capital. Amer. J. Sociol. 94 S95–S120; 
1988. 
 
12. Cowan, R.; Jonard, N.; Ozman, M. Knowledge dynamics in a network industry. 
Technological Forecasting & Social Change 71:469-484; 2004. 
 
13. Cowan, R.; Jonard, N.; Zimmermann, J. Bilateral collaboraton and the emergence of 
innovation networks. Management Science 53(7):1051-1067; 2007. 
 
14. Cowan R., Jonard N. Knowledge portfolios and the Organization of innovation networks 
Academy of Management Review. Vol. 34, No. 2, 320–342; 2009. 
 
 104 
15. Debackere K., Clarysse B., Rappa M. Dismantling the Ivory Tower: The Influence of 
Networks on Innovative Output in Emerging Technologies. Technological Forecasting and 
Social Change 53, 139-154; 1996. 
 
16. Federal Register, Articles Search Site. Retrieved in October 2013 from 
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/search.; 2013.   
 
17. Fritsch M., Kauffeld-Monz M., The impact of network structure on knowledge transfer: an 
application of social network analysis in the context of regional innovation networks. Ann 
Reg Sci. 44:21–38; 2010.  
 
18. Granovetter, M.S. The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology 78, 1360-1380; 
1973. 
 
19. Griliches Z., Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey. (p. 287 - 343) In: R&D and 
Productivity: The Econometric Evidence. University of Chicago Press; January 1998. 
 
20. Gulati R. Social Structure and Alliance Formation Patterns: A Longitudinal Analysis 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 40: 619-652; 1995. 
 
21. Hausman, J., B. Hall, Z. Griliches. Econometric models for count data with an application to 
the patents-R&D relationship. Econometrica 52 909–938; 1984.  
 
22. Iandoli, L.; Marchione. E.; Ponsiglione, C.; Zollo, G. Knowledge exchange processes in 
industrial districts and the emergence of networks. Cejor 20:231-250; 2012. 
 
23. Kogut, B. The Stability of Joint Ventures: Reciprocity and Competitive Rivalry. Journal of 
Industrial Economics 38(2): 183–198; 1989. 
 
24. Lovejoy, W. S.; Sinha, A. Efficient structures for innovative social networks. Management 
Science 1-9; 2010. 
 
25. Monthe J.D.L., Link. A., Networks, Alliances and Partnerships in the Innovation Process. 
Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers Group; 2002.    
 
26. Noteboom, B., Haverbeke W.V., Duysters G., Gilsing V., Oord A. Optimal cognitive 
distance and absorptive capacity. Research Policy 36 1016–1034; 2007.   
 
27. Opsahl, T., Agneessens, F., Skvoretz, J. Node centrality in weighted networks: Generalizing 
degree and shortest paths. Social Networks 32 (3), 245-251; 2010.  
 
28. Owen-Smith J., Powell W.W., Knowledge Networks as Channels and Conduits: The Effects 
of Spillovers in the Boston Biotechnology Community. Organization Science: Vol. 15, No. 1, 
pp. 5–21; January–February 2004.  
 
 105 
29. Padula G. Enhancing the Innovation Performance of Firms by Balancing Cohesiveness and 
Bridging Ties. Long Range Planning 41. 395e419; 2008. 
 
30. Powell W.W. Kenneth W. Koput and Laurel Smith-Doerr  Interorganizational Collaboration 
and the Locus of Innovation: Networks of Learning in Biotechnology. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 1; pp. 116-145; March 1996. 
 
31. R Development Core Team (2008). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. 
R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria. ISBN 3-900051-07-0, URL 
http://www.R-project.org. 
 
32. Sabidussi, G. The centrality index of a graph. Psychometrica 31: 581-603; 1966. 
 
33. Schilling, M. A. Phelps C. C., Interfirm collaboration networks: The Impact of large-scale 
network structure on firm innovation. Management Science 53(7):1113-1126; 2007. 
 
34. Stuart T.E. Network Positions and Propensities to Collaborate: An Investigation of Strategic 
Alliance Formation in a High-Technology Industry. Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 
43, No. 3; pp. 668-698 (Sep., 1998). 
 
35. The US Department of Justice: Filing a Notification Under the NCRPA. Retrieved from 
December 2012 to October 2013: http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ncrpa.html.; 
2013.  
 
36. Torres-Reyna, O. Panel Data Analysis: Fixed and Random Effects. Princeton University Data 
and Statistical services. Retrieved in October 2013 from 
http://www.princeton.edu/~otorres/Panel101.pdf; 2013.  
 
37. Tsai W. Knowledge Transfer in Intraorganizational Networks: Effects of Network Position 
and Absorptive Capacity on Business Unit Innovation and Performance. The Academy of 
Management Journal 44(5): 996-1004; 2001. 
 
38. USPTO Patent Full Text and Image Database. Explanation of Data. Retrieved in October 
2013 from http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/stcasga/explan_stcorg.htm; 
2013. 
 
39. USPTO Patent Full Text and Image Database. Patent Statistics by Organization. Retrieved 
October 2013 from http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/stcasga/usa_stcorg.htm; 
2013. 
 
40. Wasserman, S.; Faust K., Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications. New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press; 1994. 
 
 
 
 106 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND CONTRIBUTION 
  
 The two fundamental questions that inspired this dissertation research were: 1) What kind 
of strategies allow organizations to attain the required effective invention results in a relationship 
network? 2) What is the most effective structural positioning in such a network of relationships? 
Three independent studies were employed to answer these questions using three different 
methodologies.  
 The simulation study sought to explore the effectiveness of three different collaboration 
strategies. This research not only indicated the most effective and consistent strategies, but also 
indicated where they are most useful both in terms of changing environments of technological 
dynamism and in terms of invention type developed in the context of collaboration. These 
exploratory results bring unique contributions to both companies and governments motivated to 
collaborate for the purpose of solving industrial problems and bring solutions to society. Besides 
its broader impact, it also makes methodological contributions. The simulation is robust in terms 
of allowing multilateral collaborations between the collaborating agents. It also allows for 
various numbers of combinations in the strategies of the members. Perhaps more importantly, it 
is open for further development in order to mimic the practical behavior of collaborating 
organizations.  
 The survey study was administered within a regional economy across all industries. It 
provided cross sectional data from the most inventive organizations in the State of Florida. As 
the second research question states, the impact of positional metrics on invention performance 
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was investigated. A methodological contribution of this study is the introduction of five different 
relationship types in the construction of the network map. Although very sensitive to the network 
data, the results give insight regarding what type of positioning is associated with higher 
effectiveness in invention performance. The two prominent metrics, degree and closeness 
centralities, are found to have the highest impact are being close in terms of network distances 
and being in collaboration with highest performers.  
 The Federal Register database that announces notices of National Cooperative Research 
and Production Act provides a unique opportunity to construct the alliance relationship network 
of organizations since 1994. The longitudinal data provided information for an array of analyses 
from the investigation of research joint ventures to the network positional impacts on inventive 
performance. Similar to the previous study, closeness centrality is found to be highly and 
significantly associated with the invention performance of organizations. In future research, it 
may be interesting to investigate the ways of reducing distances in between the members of the 
network to access technological knowledge. It is also important that local clustering is found to 
impact the invention performance, which corroborates the supporters of the benefit of local 
clustering rather than those who emphasize its negative impact due to its redundancy. The 
interaction of closeness and clustering, however, is found to have a significant negative impact, 
which calls for further investigation.   
It is true that sometimes inventions become the subject of competition. However, 
solutions to our health problems, communication or transportation needs etc. depend on how 
well we recombine the existing and enhancing technological knowledge. Inventions are not 
usually the product of fortunate events. They are the product of an effective process for the 
recombination of technological knowledge. Also, effective invention performance is not only 
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important for organizations individually, it is crucial for governments that are concerned with the 
problems of society. In a broader sense, solutions to many problems can be as easy as the 
utilization of technological knowledge in a network of relationships or utilization of untapped 
collaboration opportunities. In this research, effective ways to facilitate recombination of 
technological knowledge is addressed and presented to inform both companies and policy 
makers. Better understanding on the dynamics of the invention process may bring better 
solutions to our existing problems.  
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Appendix A: R Code for the Simulation of Collaborative Invention Networks  
 
        ### COLLABORATIVE INNOVATION NETWORKS - SIMULATION MODEL ### 
  
## Start with:   
  
install.packages(ggplot2); require(ggplot2) 
install.packages(ggplot) ; require(ggplot) 
install.packages(igraph) ; require(igraph) 
install.packages(tnet)   ; require(tnet) 
install.packages(MASS)   ; require(MASS) 
install.packages(lmtest) ; require(lmtest) 
install.packages(gplots) ; require(gplots) 
  
MAIN.TABLE = data.frame(matrix(0, nrow=18, ncol=12)) 
for (i in seq(1, 18, 3)) for (j in seq(1, 12, 2)) MAIN.TABLE[i,j] = "CC" 
for (i in seq(2, 18, 3)) for (j in seq(1, 12, 2)) MAIN.TABLE[i,j] = "RC" 
for (i in seq(3, 18, 3)) for (j in seq(1, 12, 2)) MAIN.TABLE[i,j] = "SC" 
  
# THE MAIN TABLE IS BEING FILLED NOW 
for (q in c(0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1)) 
  for (r in c(0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1)) { 
      
# Replications of experiments  
Performance.table = NULL 
for (n in 1:10) {  
         
#Global parameters 
N=24  # Number of organizations (!! must be multiple of 3, for now !!) 
k=5   # Technological knowledge elements (the last two elements of the CCs are initialized separately, in case of a parameter change)  
K=200 # Initial (normal random) knowledge endowment average. Std. dev= K/5.    
alpha = q # Proposal acceptance rate. It is a binomial probability (number of accepted connections are binomially distributed) 
lambda=0.5 # (1-lambda) is termination rate. Number of continuing connections are binomially distributed   
ph=2  # The number of projects that an organization proposes when the latter is highly desirable to work with  
pl=1  # The number of projects that an organization proposes when the latter is moderately desirable to work with  
cyc = 20 # Number of cycles (terms) each replication will run 
beta = r  # The difference level at which the knowledge complementariness is awarded (pays off for invention) 
  
#This simulation consists of 6 stages:  
# 1) Initialization of agents' states and connection matrix  
# 2) Partnership proposal (preparation for joint venturing)  
# 3) Response to proposal (formation of network connections) 
# 4) Invention count increase   
# 5) Technological Knowledge increase 
# 6) Presentation (only when necessary) 
  
# Functions 
is.wholenumber <- function(x, tol = .Machine$double.eps^0.5)  abs(x - round(x)) < tol 
  
# ================================== 1) Initialization Stage ================================== 
  
#List of agents in network simulation: CC: Cognitive Cooperator, RC: Relational Cooperator, SC: Structural Cooperator.  
agent.list = NULL 
for (i in (N/N):(N/3)) {  agent.list = c(agent.list, i) ; agent.list[i] = sub("^", "CC", i) } 
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for (i in ((N/3)+1):(N/(3/2))) { agent.list = c(agent.list, i) ; agent.list[i] = sub("^", "RC", (i-N/3)) } 
for (i in ((N/(3/2))+1):N) { agent.list = c(agent.list, i) ; agent.list[i] = sub("^", "SC", (i-(N/(3/2)))) } 
  
#Assign each agent's ID, strategy and initialize the values of knowledge elements and invention counts 
Agents.state = NULL 
for (i in (N/N):(N/3)) {  
    Agents.state <- cbind(Agents.state, c(ID=i, Str.type=1, Knowledge=round(runif(k, 0, K)), InventionCount=sample(1000000,1))) 
} 
for (i in ((N/3)+1):(N/(3/2))) {  
    Agents.state <- cbind(Agents.state, c(ID=i, Str.type=2, Knowledge=round(runif(k, 0, K)), InventionCount=sample(1000000,1))) 
} 
for (i in ((N/(3/2))+1):N) { 
    Agents.state <- cbind(Agents.state, c(ID=i, Str.type=3, Knowledge=round(runif(k, 0, K)), InventionCount=sample(1000000,1))) 
} 
  
colnames(Agents.state) <- agent.list 
for (i in 1:k+3)  
  for (j in 1:N) 
if (Agents.state[i,j] < 0) Agents.state[i,j] = 0 
  
#A random initial Network Matrix and a zero Proposal Matrix are created  
  
Initial.N.Matrix <- matrix(0, nrow = length(agent.list), ncol = length(agent.list)) 
for (i in 1:N) { 
  Initial.N.Matrix[i,] <- sample(c(2, 1 , sample(0, N-2, replace=TRUE))) 
  while (Initial.N.Matrix[i,i] != 0) Initial.N.Matrix[i,] <- sample(c(2, 1 , sample(0, N-2, replace=TRUE)))  
} 
colnames(Initial.N.Matrix) <- agent.list 
Current.N.Matrix <- Initial.N.Matrix 
Proposal.Matrix <- matrix(0, nrow = length(agent.list), ncol = length(agent.list)) 
colnames(Proposal.Matrix) <- agent.list 
  
# ================================= End of Initialization Stage ================================= 
  
# Some performance variables are initialized here  
  
Mean.perf.CC = rep(0, cyc) ; Mean.perf.RC = rep(0, cyc) ; Mean.perf.SC = rep(0, cyc) 
  
  
#Let's run for cyc number of cycles 
for (m in 1:cyc) { 
  
# There are 3 stages in this cycle: 2)Partnership proposal, 3) Response to Proposal, 4) Inventions  
  
# =============================== 2) Partnership Proposals Stage ================================ 
  
# Step-1: CCs identify their worst knowledge element, i.e., smallest in value 
Worst.elements = NULL 
for (i in (N/N):(N/3)) {  
  Worst.elements <- cbind(Worst.elements, c(order(Agents.state[3:(k+2),i])[1:2])) 
} 
colnames(Worst.elements) <- agent.list[(N/N):(N/3)] 
  
# Step-2: CCs want to know who has the best for their worst knowledge element, i.e., highest in value 
Best.partners = NULL 
for (i in (N/N):(N/3)) {  
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  Best.partners <- cbind(Best.partners,   
  c(if (order(Agents.state[Worst.elements[1,i]+2,-i])[N-1] >= i) order(Agents.state[Worst.elements[1,i]+2,-i])[N-1]+1  
    else order(Agents.state[Worst.elements[1,i]+2,-i])[N-1],   
         
    if (order(Agents.state[Worst.elements[2,i]+2,-i])[N-1] >= i) order(Agents.state[Worst.elements[2,i]+2,-i])[N-1]+1 
    else order(Agents.state[Worst.elements[2,i]+2,-i])[N-1]))  
} 
  
# Step-3: CCs' proposals are temporarily recorded. But first we need to set all entries to zero for the second cycle and on. 
Proposal.Matrix[,] = 0 
for (i in (N/N):(N/3)) {  
  Proposal.Matrix[i,Best.partners[1,i]] <- ph 
  Proposal.Matrix[i,Best.partners[2,i]] <- pl 
} 
  
# Step-4: RCs send proposals only to their current connections  
Trusted.partners = NULL 
for (i in ((N/3)+1):(N/(3/2))) {  
                             Trusted.indices = NULL                    
                             Trusted.indices = which(Current.N.Matrix[i,]==max(Current.N.Matrix[i,])) 
  if  (length(Trusted.indices) > 2) 
       Trusted.partners <- rbind(Trusted.partners, c(sample(order(Current.N.Matrix[i,])[N:(1+N-length(Trusted.indices))])[1:2]))   
  
  if  (length(Trusted.indices) == 2)    # the two members have the same number of ties - not to confuse with different number of ties 
       Trusted.partners <- rbind(Trusted.partners, c(sample(order(Current.N.Matrix[i,])[N:(N-1)]))) 
   
  if  ((length(Trusted.indices) == 1) & (length(which(Current.N.Matrix[i,][-Trusted.indices] == max(Current.N.Matrix[i,][-Trusted.indices]))) == (N-
1)) ) 
       Trusted.partners <- rbind(Trusted.partners, c(order(Current.N.Matrix[i,])[N], order(Current.N.Matrix[i,])[N] )) 
   
  if  ((length(Trusted.indices) == 1) & (length(which(Current.N.Matrix[i,][-Trusted.indices] == max(Current.N.Matrix[i,][-Trusted.indices]))) != (N-
1)) )  
      Trusted.partners <- rbind(Trusted.partners, c(order(Current.N.Matrix[i,])[N], order(Current.N.Matrix[i,])[N-1]))     
   
  if (Trusted.partners[i+1-((N/3)+1),1] == Trusted.partners[i+1-((N/3)+1),2]) 
      Proposal.Matrix[i,Trusted.partners[i+1-((N/3)+1),1]] <- ph+pl 
  else { 
    Proposal.Matrix[i,Trusted.partners[i+1-((N/3)+1),1]] <- ph 
    Proposal.Matrix[i,Trusted.partners[i+1-((N/3)+1),2]] <- pl   } 
} 
  
# Step-5: SCs want to know who has currently the highest number of connections: order(colSums(Initial.N.Matrix))[N] 
#         OR 
#         *** SCs also want to know who has the highest number of invention count: order(Agents.state[k+3,])[N]  
#         SCs' proposals are temporarily recorded 
  
#for (i in ((N/(3/2))+1):N) { 
#  Proposal.Matrix[i,order(colSums(rbind(colSums(Current.N.Matrix), rowSums(Current.N.Matrix))))[N]] <- 3 
#  if (Proposal.Matrix[i,i] != 0) { Proposal.Matrix[i,i] = 0 
#                                   Proposal.Matrix[i,order(colSums(rbind(colSums(Current.N.Matrix), rowSums(Current.N.Matrix))))[N-1]] <- 3  
#                                 }  
#    else Proposal.Matrix[i,order(colSums(rbind(colSums(Current.N.Matrix), rowSums(Current.N.Matrix))))[N-1]] <- 1 
#        if (Proposal.Matrix[i,i] != 0) { Proposal.Matrix[i,i] = 0 
#                                         Proposal.Matrix[i,order(colSums(rbind(colSums(Current.N.Matrix), rowSums(Current.N.Matrix))))[N-2]] <- 1  
#                                       } 
#} 
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for ( i in ((N/(3/2))+1):N) { 
  Proposal.Matrix[i, order(Agents.state[k+3,])[N]] <- ph 
  if (Proposal.Matrix[i,i] != 0) { Proposal.Matrix[i,i] = 0 ; Proposal.Matrix[i, order(Agents.state[k+3,])[N-1]] <- ph } 
  else Proposal.Matrix[i, order(Agents.state[k+3,])[N-1]] <- pl 
    if (Proposal.Matrix[i,i] != 0) { Proposal.Matrix[i,i] = 0 ; Proposal.Matrix[i, order(Agents.state[k+3,])[N-2]] <- pl } 
} 
  
# ============================== End of Partnership Proposals Stage ============================== 
  
# =============================== 3) Responsing to Proposals Stage =============================== 
  
# Previously Proposal Matrix was finalized. Now 1) Each  proposal is accepted or rejected (or partially accepted).  
#                                               2) Current Network Matrix is partially reduced (some ventures are terminated) 
#                                               3) Responses are superimposed (added) to Current Network Matrix. 
  
# Step-1:  
Response.Matrix = Proposal.Matrix 
for (i in 1:N) { 
  for (j in 1:N) { 
    t = Proposal.Matrix[i,j] 
    Response.Matrix[i,j] = rbinom(1, t, alpha) 
  } 
} 
  
# Step-2:  
for (i in 1:N) { 
  for (j in 1:N) { 
    t = Current.N.Matrix[i,j] 
    Current.N.Matrix[i,j] = rbinom(1, t, lambda) 
  } 
} 
  
# Step-3: 
Current.N.Matrix <- Current.N.Matrix + Response.Matrix 
  
# ============================ End of Responsing to Proposals Stage =============================== 
  
  
# Temporarily generated invention counts are set to 0 to avoid the impact of initial endowments (done only in the 1st cycle) 
if (m==1) Agents.state[k+3,] = 0 
  
  
# ============================= 4) Invention Counts Increase Stage ================================ 
  
# Now, practically, 1) More resources means more chances of innovation 
#                   2) Better knowledge capacity means more chances of innovation 
#                   3) Knowledge complementariness is hypothesized to provide advantage    
  
# Step-1: Resources are translated into connections so (Degree centrality impact is taken into account) 
Agents.state[k+3,] <- Agents.state[k+3,] + round(colSums(rbind(colSums(Current.N.Matrix), rowSums(Current.N.Matrix)))/2) 
  
# Step-2: Organizations with knowledge elements at certain percentiles make inventions increasingly. Knowledge stock is multiplied by 1-alpha 
parameter 
for (i in 3:(k+2)) { 
  Quantile5 <- quantile(Agents.state[i,], probs = seq(0, 1, 0.25), na.rm = FALSE, type = 3) 
 114 
  for (j in 1:N) {    
                  KS.increase=seq(0, 0, length.out = N) 
                  for (l in 1:5)   
                    if (Agents.state[i,j] >= Quantile5[l]) KS.increase[j] <- KS.increase[j] + 1 
                        Agents.state[k+3,j] <- Agents.state[k+3,j] + round((KS.increase[j]))  
                 } 
} 
  
# Step-3: Invention increase due to knowledge complementariness (complementariness impact is to be investigated)  
  
for (i in 3:(k+2)) {  
  Tech.range <- max(Agents.state[i,]) - min(Agents.state[i,]) 
  for (j in 1:N)   
    for (l in 1:N) { 
      k.check = NULL ; 
      if (Current.N.Matrix[j,l] != 0) {  
        for (p in 3:(k+2)) {           
          k.check = c(k.check, Agents.state[p,j] > Agents.state[p,l])  
                           } ; 
          if (length(unique(k.check)) > 1) { 
             Ind.percentage <- abs(Agents.state[i,j] - Agents.state[i,l])/Tech.range 
             Agents.state[k+3,l] <- Agents.state[k+3,l] + round((1 - abs(Ind.percentage-beta))*Current.N.Matrix[j,l]) 
             Agents.state[k+3,j] <- Agents.state[k+3,j] + round((1 - abs(Ind.percentage-beta))*Current.N.Matrix[j,l]) 
                                        }     
} 
} 
} 
  
# =========================== End of Invention Invention Counts Increase Stage ======================== 
  
# ============================ 5) Technological Knowledge Increase Stage ========================== 
  
# Step-1: Increase due to partnerships: The organization who has a lower knowledge element benefits 
Max.coll = max(Current.N.Matrix[,]) 
for (i in 3:(k+2)) { 
  for (j in 1:N)   
    for (l in 1:N) 
      if ((Current.N.Matrix[j,l] != 0) & (Agents.state[i,l] - Agents.state[i,j] > 0))  
         Agents.state[i,j] <- Agents.state[i,j] + round(((Current.N.Matrix[j,l]/Max.coll)*(Agents.state[i,l] - Agents.state[i,j]))/2) 
      if ((Current.N.Matrix[j,l] != 0) & (Agents.state[i,l] - Agents.state[i,j] < 0))  
          Agents.state[i,l] <- Agents.state[i,l] + round(((Current.N.Matrix[j,l]/Max.coll)*(Agents.state[i,j] - Agents.state[i,l]))/2)     
}        
  
# Step-2: Inventions cause knowledge increase too (NOT ACCOMPLISHED YET: LIMITATION) 
  
# Step-3: Increase/decrease due to other factors. Assumed uniformly distributed with mean 0 and std.dev=K/..   
  
for (i in 3:(k+2))  
  for (j in 1:N) { 
    Agents.state[i,j] <- Agents.state[i,j] + round(runif(1, -K/2, K/2)) 
    if (Agents.state[i,j] < 0) Agents.state[i,j] = 0 
                  } 
  
# ======================== End of Technological Knowledge Increase Stage =========================== 
  
# =============================== 6) Presentation Stage =================================== 
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# Longitudinal plot variables created Mean/SD 
  
Mean.perf.CC[m] = round(mean(Agents.state[k+3,(N/N):(N/3)])) 
Mean.perf.RC[m] = round(mean(Agents.state[k+3,((N/3)+1):(N/(3/2))])) 
Mean.perf.SC[m] = round(mean(Agents.state[k+3,((N/(3/2))+1):N])) 
  
#SD.perf.CC[m] = round(sd(Agents.state[k+3,(N/N):(N/3)])) 
#SD.perf.RC[m] = round(sd(Agents.state[k+3,((N/3)+1):(N/(3/2))])) 
#SD.perf.SC[m] = round(sd(Agents.state[k+3,((N/(3/2))+1):N])) 
  
# Presantation at the end of some cycles 
  
  
if (is.wholenumber(m/571)) { 
  
# Presentation of the network 
  
  g1 <- graph.adjacency(Current.N.Matrix) 
  par(mfrow=c(1,2)) 
  plot(g1, layout=layout.auto, vertex.size=4,  
       vertex.label.dist=0, vertex.label.degree=pi, vertex.color="red", edge.arrow.size=0.01) 
  
# Presentation of the invention counts table 
   
  CCinventions = NULL; RCinventions = NULL; SCinventions = NULL  
  for (i in (N/N):(N/3)) CCinventions <- rbind(CCinventions, Agents.state[k+3,i]) 
  for (i in ((N/3)+1):(N/(3/2))) RCinventions <- rbind(RCinventions, Agents.state[k+3,i]) 
  for (i in ((N/(3/2))+1): N) SCinventions <- rbind(SCinventions, Agents.state[k+3,i]) 
  Matrix.represantation = NULL 
  Matrix.represantation <- cbind(CCinventions, RCinventions, SCinventions)  
  colnames(Matrix.represantation) <- c("CC", "RC", "SC") 
  Rows.names = NULL; for (i in 1:(N/3)) Rows.names <- cbind(Rows.names, i) 
  rownames(Matrix.represantation) <- Rows.names 
  textplot(Matrix.represantation, cex=1.0, valign="top"); title("Invention Counts") 
} 
  
# Cycles Mean/SD Plot 
  
if (is.wholenumber(m/571)) { 
  
par(mfrow=c(1,2)) 
g_range <- range(0, Mean.perf.CC, Mean.perf.RC, Mean.perf.SC) 
  
plot(Mean.perf.CC, type="o", col="blue", ylim=g_range,  
     axes=TRUE, ann=FALSE) 
lines(Mean.perf.RC, type="o", pch=22, lty=2, col="red") 
lines(Mean.perf.SC, type="o", pch=23, lty=3, col="green") 
  
title(xlab="Cycles") 
title(ylab="Mean invention count") 
  
legend(1, g_range[2], c("CCinventions","RCinventions","SCinventions"), cex=0.8,  
      col=c("blue","red","green"), pch=21:23, lty=1:3); 
  
title(main="Average Performance of Strategy Groups", col.main="black", font.main=2) 
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} 
  
}  # end of cyc count 
  
#graph.density(g1) 
#centralization.degree(g1) 
  
# Presentation of winners table in each replication Mean/SD 
  
par(mfrow=c(1,1)) 
  
Winner=NULL  
if (max(Mean.perf.CC[m], Mean.perf.RC[m], Mean.perf.SC[m]) == Mean.perf.CC[m]) Winner=c("CC") 
if (max(Mean.perf.CC[m], Mean.perf.RC[m], Mean.perf.SC[m]) == Mean.perf.RC[m]) Winner=c("RC") 
if (max(Mean.perf.CC[m], Mean.perf.RC[m], Mean.perf.SC[m]) == Mean.perf.SC[m]) Winner=c("SC") 
Performance.table = rbind(Performance.table, cbind(Mean.perf.CC[m], Mean.perf.RC[m], Mean.perf.SC[m], Winner)) 
colnames(Performance.table) = c("CC", "RC", "SC", "Winner") 
textplot(Performance.table, cex=1.0, valign="top") ; title("Leaders at Mean performances over 10 replications") 
  
#if (min(SD.perf.CC[m], SD.perf.RC[m], SD.perf.SC[m]) == SD.perf.CC[m]) Winner=c("CC") 
#if (min(SD.perf.CC[m], SD.perf.RC[m], SD.perf.SC[m]) == SD.perf.RC[m]) Winner=c("RC") 
#if (min(SD.perf.CC[m], SD.perf.RC[m], SD.perf.SC[m]) == SD.perf.SC[m]) Winner=c("SC") 
#Performance.table = rbind(Performance.table, cbind(Mean.perf.CC[m], Mean.perf.RC[m], Mean.perf.SC[m], Winner)) 
#colnames(Performance.table) = c("CC", "RC", "SC", "The Smallest SD") 
#textplot(Performance.table, cex=1.0, valign="top") ; title("Standsrd deviation performances over 10 replications") 
  
} # end of 10 replications set 
  
if (r==0) MTrow=16; if (r==0.2) MTrow=13; if (r==0.4) MTrow=10; if (r==0.6) MTrow=7; if (r==0.8) MTrow=4; if (r==1) MTrow=1; 
MTcol = (q+.1)*10 
  
MAIN.TABLE[MTrow:((MTrow-1)+nrow(as.data.frame(table(factor(Performance.table[,4], lev=c("CC", "RC", "SC")))))),MTcol:(MTcol+1)] = 
as.data.frame(table(factor(Performance.table[,4], lev=c("CC", "RC", "SC")))) 
  
for (i in seq(1, 18, 3)) for (j in seq(1, 12, 2)) MAIN.TABLE[i,j] = "CC" 
for (i in seq(2, 18, 3)) for (j in seq(1, 12, 2)) MAIN.TABLE[i,j] = "RC" 
for (i in seq(3, 18, 3)) for (j in seq(1, 12, 2)) MAIN.TABLE[i,j] = "SC" 
  
textplot(MAIN.TABLE, cex=1.0, valign="top") ; title("Mean invention performance (replication winners) at various alpha vs. beta") 
  
#textplot(MAIN.TABLE, cex=1.0, valign="top") ; title("The SD performances at various alpha vs. beta") 
  
write.csv(MAIN.TABLE, "MAIN.TABLE.csv") 
} # end of Main Table construction 
  
#require(xlsx) 
write.csv(MAIN.TABLE, "MAIN.TABLE.csv") 
  
# ================================== End of Presentations Stage ============================= 
  
# ================================== END OF SIMULATION ============================== 
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Appendix B: Image of the Written Permission for Published Portions of Chapter 3  
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Appendix C: The Complete List of Organizations Used in the Analyses of Chapter 2 
 
Table A1. The complete list of organizations used in the analyses of Chapter 2 
1 IBM Int. Business Machines 
2 Hewlett-Packard & Hp Dev.  
3 Intel Corporation 
4 Micron Technology, Inc. 
5 Microsoft Corporation 
6 General Electric Company 
7 Motorola, Inc. 
8 Texas Instruments, Inc. 
9 Eastman Kodak Company 
10 Xerox Corporation 
11 Lucent Inc. (Alcatel After 2006) 
12 AT&T Corp. 
13 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. 
14 General Motors 
15 3m Minnesota Mining Manuf. 
16 Cisco Technology, Inc. 
17 Honeywell International Inc. 
18 Sun Micr. Inc. (Oracle After 2009) 
19 Ford Motors 
20 University Of California 
21 Broadcom Corporation 
22 Boeing Company 
23 E. I. Du Pont De Nemours And Co. 
24 Qualcomm, Inc. 
25 United States Of America, Navy 
26 Applied Materials, Inc. 
27 Siemens 
28 Procter & Gamble Company 
29 Apple, Inc. 
30 Delphi Technologies, Inc. 
31 Seagate Technology, Llc 
32 Exxon (Mobil, Chemical, All) 
33 Oracle International Corp. 
34 Caterpillar Inc. 
35 Lockheed Martin Corporation 
36 Philips Electronics 
37 Medtronic Inc. 
38 LSI Logic Corporation 
39 Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc. 
40 Agilent Technologies, Inc. 
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Table A1. (Continued) 
41 National Semiconductor Corp. 
42 Sony Corporation 
43 Raytheon Company 
44 Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. 
45 United Technologies Corporation 
46 Xilinx, Inc. 
47 Baker Hughes Incorporated 
48 Illinois Tool Works Inc. 
49 United States Of America, Army 
50 Hitachi  
51 Schlumberger Technology Corp. 
52 Eaton Corporation 
53 Freescale Semiconductor 
54 Corning Incorporated 
55 Emc Corporation 
56 Massachusetts Institute Of Tech. 
57 Dell Products, L.P. 
58 Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. 
59 Northrop Grumman Corporation 
60 Monsanto Technology, Llc 
61 Chrysler Motors Corporation 
62 Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. 
63 Usa, Dep. Of Health & Human Serv. 
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